{"id":548,"date":"2018-04-09T12:31:40","date_gmt":"2018-04-09T09:31:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/teoriveeylem.net\/?p=548"},"modified":"2023-01-18T14:28:40","modified_gmt":"2023-01-18T11:28:40","slug":"staline-karsi-yevzhov-sscbde-1937-1938-yillarindaki-kitlesel-baskilarin-nedenleri","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/teoriveeylem.net\/tr\/2018\/04\/09\/staline-karsi-yevzhov-sscbde-1937-1938-yillarindaki-kitlesel-baskilarin-nedenleri\/","title":{"rendered":"Stalin\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 Yevzhov: SSCB\u2019de 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131ndaki kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenleri"},"content":{"rendered":"

Grover Furr*<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00c7eviren: Eren Can<\/strong><\/p>\n

Bu makale, 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131nda SSCB\u2019de ya\u015fanan kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenlerini ana hatlar\u0131yla ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. Birincil kaynaklardan elde edilen bilgiler, bu bask\u0131lar\u0131n birbiriyle kesi\u015fen iki ayr\u0131 grup taraf\u0131ndan yap\u0131lan Stalin kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 komplolar\u0131n bir sonucu oldu\u011fu tezini g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde desteklemektedir. Bu gruplardan birincisini Grigorii Zinovyev, Tro\u00e7ki ve Sa\u011fc\u0131lar\u0131n (Buharin, Rikov ve taraftarlar\u0131) siyasi Muhalefetinin destek\u00e7ileri ile Mare\u015fal Mihail Tuha\u00e7evski ve di\u011fer askerler olu\u015ftururken, ikinci grubu ise 1936 <\/em>\u201cStalin<\/em>\u201d Anayasas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n demokratik y\u00f6nlerine kar\u015f\u0131 olan s\u00f6zde Stalin destek\u00e7ileri ve \u00fcst d\u00fczey parti liderleri olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. Bu makale, Stalin\u2019in demokratik reform m\u00fccadelesini ve bu m\u00fccadelenin yenilgisini tart\u0131\u015fmakta, yanl\u0131\u015f bir bi\u00e7imde <\/em>\u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131 ana ak\u0131m tarih\u00e7ilerin anlamama nedeni olarak, Sovyet tarihi bak\u0131m\u0131ndan hakim olan <\/em>\u201canti-Stalin paradigma<\/em>\u201dy\u0131 ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. <\/em><\/p>\n

G\u0130R\u0130\u015e<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nikita S. Kru\u015f\u00e7ev, 25 \u015eubat 1956\u2019da, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi Kom\u00fcnist Partisi 20. Kongresi\u2019nde delegelere hitaben bir \u201cGizli Konu\u015fma<\/em>\u201d yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu konu\u015fmada Kru\u015f\u00e7ev, Parti \u00fcyelerine kar\u015f\u0131 bir dizi su\u00e7 i\u015fledi\u011fi su\u00e7lamas\u0131yla Stalin\u2019e sald\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kru\u015f\u00e7ev bu konu\u015fmas\u0131nda \u015funlar\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir:<\/p>\n

\u201c17. Kongre\u2019de se\u00e7ilmi\u015f Merkez Komite \u00fcyeleri ve adaylar\u0131ndan olu\u015fan 139 ki\u015fiden 98\u2019i, yani y\u00fczde 70\u2019i, (\u00e7o\u011funlukla 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131nda) tutuklanm\u0131\u015f ve vurulmu\u015ftur. \u2026 Dan\u0131\u015fmanl\u0131k ya da oy hakk\u0131 bulunan 1.966 delegeden 1.108 ki\u015fi kar\u015f\u0131 devrimci su\u00e7lar y\u00fcklenerek tutuklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2026 \u015eimdi, \u2018sabotajc\u0131\u2019 ya da \u2018ajan\u2019 olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan bu ki\u015filerin baz\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n dava dosyalar\u0131 incelendi\u011finde, bunlar\u0131n hepsinin uydurma oldu\u011fu g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/em><\/p>\n

D\u00fc\u015fman faaliyetleriyle su\u00e7lanan ve tutuklananlar\u0131n su\u00e7 itiraflar\u0131 ise, insanl\u0131k d\u0131\u015f\u0131 ve zorbaca i\u015fkence yard\u0131m\u0131yla elde edilmi\u015ftir.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Kru\u015f\u00e7ev, A\u011fustos 1936 – Kas\u0131m 1938 tarihleri aras\u0131nda NKVD Komiseri olan Nikolai Yevzhov\u2019un, Stalin\u2019in emri alt\u0131nda hareket etti\u011fini iddia etmi\u015ftir:<\/p>\n

\u201cA\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r ki, bu mesele Stalin taraf\u0131ndan kararla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve Yevzhov bunlar\u0131 Stalin\u2019in emirleri ve onay\u0131 olmadan yapamaz.<\/em>\u201d (Kru\u015f\u00e7ev, 1962)<\/p>\n

\u201cB\u00dcY\u00dcK TER\u00d6R\u201d YALANI<\/strong><\/p>\n

1968 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u0130ngiliz yazar Robert Conquest, B\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r: Stalin\u2019in 1930\u2019lardaki Tasfiyesi <\/em>ad\u0131yla bir kitap yay\u0131nlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Conquest, iddialar\u0131n\u0131, kaynak sorgulamas\u0131 yapmadan, sanki kesin do\u011fruymu\u015f gibi al\u0131nt\u0131lad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kitap ve makalelere dayand\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. Conquest\u2019in kitab\u0131n\u0131n anti-kom\u00fcnist propaganda i\u00e7in \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck bir de\u011fer ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131 su g\u00f6t\u00fcrmez bir ger\u00e7ektir. Hatta tarih ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar\u0131 bu \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d kavram\u0131n\u0131, Sovyet tarihinin bir d\u00f6nemine i\u015faret etmek i\u00e7in kullanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Anti-Stalin Paradigma<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yeni kitab\u0131m Stalin\u2019e Kar\u015f\u0131 Yevzhov<\/em>\u2019un amac\u0131, bu kitlesel bask\u0131n\u0131n nedenlerini ve sorumlular\u0131n\u0131 yerli yerinde tan\u0131mlamakt\u0131r. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi tarih\u00e7ileri bu bask\u0131 d\u00f6nemine \u00e7e\u015fitli a\u00e7\u0131klamalar \u00f6nermi\u015flerdir. Benim ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131m ise bunlar\u0131n hepsinin temelde yanl\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu sonucunu ortaya \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda bu tarih\u00e7iler, kitlesel bask\u0131n\u0131n nedenlerini ke\u015ffetmeye de\u011fil, bu d\u00f6nem i\u00e7in k\u00f6r\u00fc k\u00f6r\u00fcne ara\u015ft\u0131rma yaparak, egemen olan tarihsel \u00e7er\u00e7eve ya da paradigmaya uygun olan a\u00e7\u0131klamalar bulmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Ben bu durumu \u201cAnti-Stalin<\/em>\u201d paradigma olarak adland\u0131r\u0131yorum.<\/p>\n

Anti-Stalin paradigmas\u0131n\u0131n do\u011frudan kayna\u011f\u0131 ise Leon Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin yaz\u0131lar\u0131d\u0131r. Tro\u00e7ki, kendi komplosuna hizmet edecek bir bi\u00e7imde Stalin\u2019i bir canavar olarak tasvir etmi\u015ftir. Fakat bug\u00fcn biz biliyoruz ki, Tro\u00e7ki, SSCB ve Stalin hakk\u0131nda a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a yalan s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir. Kuru\u015f\u00e7ev de yapm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu \u201cGizli Konu\u015fma<\/em>\u201dda, Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin uydurdu\u011fu bir dizi yalan\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr (Furr, 2015).<\/p>\n

1961\u2019deki 22. Parti Kongresi\u2019nde Kru\u015f\u00e7ev ve adamlar\u0131, Stalin\u2019i daha fazla su\u00e7 i\u015flemekle itham etmi\u015ftir. 1962\u2019den 1964\u2019e kadar Kru\u015f\u00e7ev, Stalin\u2019e sald\u0131ran y\u00fczlerce makale ve kitab\u0131 finansal olarak desteklemi\u015ftir. Bu sald\u0131r\u0131lar, Bat\u0131l\u0131 anti-kom\u00fcnist yazarlar taraf\u0131ndan heyecanla tekrar edilmi\u015ftir. Mihail Gorbo\u00e7ov ise, 1987-1991 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ba\u015fka bir anti-Stalin yaz\u0131lar y\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n\u0131 finansal olarak desteklemi\u015ftir. Dahas\u0131, bu yaz\u0131lar Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin ideolojik da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131na \u00f6nemli oranda katk\u0131da bulunmu\u015ftur. Fakat bug\u00fcn biliyoruz ki, Kru\u015f\u00e7ev ve Gorbo\u00e7ov\u2019un adamlar\u0131 Stalin hakk\u0131nda g\u00f6zle g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcr bir \u015fekilde yalan s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

Bu anti-Stalin paradigmaya g\u00f6re:<\/p>\n

– Stalin bir \u2018diktat\u00f6r<\/em>\u2019d\u00fcr. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, meydana gelen \u00f6nemli her \u015feyi o ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015f ya da durdurmu\u015f olmal\u0131d\u0131r. Olan her \u015fey, ya Stalin\u2019in iste\u011fi ya da onay\u0131yla olmu\u015ftur. Stalin her zaman \u2018kontrol\u00fc<\/em>\u2019 elinde tutmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n

– Stalin y\u00f6netimine kar\u015f\u0131 yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 iddia edilen komplolar tamamen uydurmad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

– 1991\u2019de SSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131ndan bu yana yay\u0131nlanan itiraflar, soru\u015fturmalar ve Moskova Davalar\u0131ndaki tan\u0131kl\u0131klar\u0131n sonucu olu\u015fmu\u015f kan\u0131tlar da uydurma olmal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Stalin d\u00f6nemini ara\u015ft\u0131ran bir\u00e7ok ana ak\u0131m tarih\u00e7i, kendilerini bu \u00f6nsel (a priori) ilkelerle ko\u015fulland\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu ilkeler, ne sorgulanm\u0131\u015f ne de bunlar\u0131 do\u011frulamaya y\u00f6nelik bir giri\u015fimde bulunulmu\u015ftur. Bu ele\u015ftiriler, hangi kan\u0131t ve a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131n kabul edilebilir oldu\u011funu belirler. Onlar\u0131n amac\u0131, ana ak\u0131m tarih yaz\u0131m\u0131nda, sadece Stalin ve SSCB\u2019yi \u201ck\u00f6t\u00fc g\u00f6steren<\/em>\u201d tarihsel a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131n yer almas\u0131n\u0131 garantiye almakt\u0131r. Bu a\u00e7\u0131klamalar, SSCB\u2019yi totaliter ve \u201cter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201dle y\u00f6netilen bir \u201cdiktat\u00f6rl\u00fck<\/em>\u201d olarak ele alan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fle uygunluk i\u00e7indedir ve bu d\u00f6nemin \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d d\u00f6nemi olarak kavramla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 peki\u015ftirirler.<\/p>\n

Bunlar, d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmeyi devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rakan varsay\u0131mlard\u0131r. Bu varsay\u0131mlar\u0131 kabul etmek, Stalin d\u00f6nemi Sovyet tarihini anlamay\u0131 imkans\u0131z hale getirir. Fakat bunlar\u0131n amac\u0131 hi\u00e7bir zaman, do\u011fru bir tarih anlat\u0131s\u0131 yapmak de\u011fil, aksine, SSCB ve Stalin\u2019i ve b\u00f6ylece 20. y\u00fczy\u0131l d\u00fcnya kom\u00fcnist hareketini fiilen \u015feytanla\u015ft\u0131rarak, anti-kom\u00fcnizmi g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmektir.<\/p>\n

\u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan kitaplar ise yay\u0131nlanmaya devam ediyor. En son \u00f6rneklerden biri \u0130ngiliz tarih\u00e7i James Harris taraf\u0131ndan yaz\u0131lan \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Korku: 1930\u2019lardaki Stalin Ter\u00f6r\u00fc<\/em>\u201d ad\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131yor. Harris\u2019in dili \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 ve Sovyet tarihi alan\u0131 i\u00e7in g\u00f6receli olarak \u00f6nyarg\u0131s\u0131zd\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Ancak, Harris\u2019in bu d\u00f6nemi inceleyen Tro\u00e7kistlerin de dahil oldu\u011fu ana ak\u0131m tarih\u00e7ilerle ortak yan\u0131, kitlesel idamlar\u0131n Stalin\u2019in eylemleri olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, aksine Yevzhov\u2019un komplosunun \u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc oldu\u011funu kan\u0131tlayan verileri g\u00f6z ard\u0131 etmesidir. Harris, uzunca bir s\u00fcredir \u00e7\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclm\u00fc\u015f olan Alman gizli plan\u0131n\u0131 Mare\u015fal Tuha\u00e7evski \u00fczerinden kurarak (169-170), Kirov\u2019un katilinin \u201ccinayeti neredeyse kesin bir \u015fekilde yaln\u0131z ba\u015f\u0131na i\u015fledi\u011fi<\/em>\u201d hikayesini tekrar ediyor ve t\u00fcm kan\u0131tlar \u00fczerinden Stalin y\u00f6netimine itiraz korkusunun yanl\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu karar\u0131na var\u0131yor.<\/p>\n

\u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d olarak bilenen kitlesel bask\u0131lar hakk\u0131ndaki ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131n kilit sorular\u0131n\u0131 \u015funlar olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r:<\/p>\n

1- Genellikle iddia edildi\u011fi gibi, y\u00fcz binlerce masum insan\u0131n katledilmesinden sorumlu ki\u015fi Stalin midir?<\/p>\n

2- E\u011fer Stalin sorumlu de\u011filse, Yevzhov ve adamlar\u0131 bir y\u0131l boyunca nas\u0131l bir\u00e7ok masum insan\u0131 \u00f6ld\u00fcrmeye devam ettiler?<\/p>\n

Bu kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131 anlamada iki olay \u00f6rg\u00fcs\u00fc \u00f6nemlidir. Birincisi, Stalin\u2019in se\u00e7imli demokrasi m\u00fccadelesi ve yenilgisidir. \u0130kincisi ise, Grigorii Zinoviev, Leon Tro\u00e7ki, Nikolay Buharin, Genrikh Iagoda, Nikolai Ezhov ve \u201cSa\u011fc\u0131lar<\/em>\u201d olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan pek \u00e7oklar\u0131n\u0131n ve en bilineni \u201cTuha\u00e7evski Meselesi<\/em>\u201d olan askeri fig\u00fcrlerin destek\u00e7ilerini i\u00e7eren birbiriyle ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131 iki komplodur.<\/p>\n

SE\u00c7\u0130MLER<\/strong><\/p>\n

1930\u2019lar boyunca Stalin liderli\u011fi, devlet y\u00f6netiminde demokrasiyi te\u015fvik etmekle ve sendikal demokrasiyi g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmekle me\u015fgul olmu\u015ftur. 1936 Aral\u0131k ay\u0131ndaki 8. Ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc Sovyetler Kongresi, gizli oy ve rekabete dayal\u0131, adayl\u0131 se\u00e7imlere yer veren yeni Sovyet Anayasa tasla\u011f\u0131n\u0131 onaylam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Zhukov, 2003, 309).<\/p>\n

Sadece Kom\u00fcnist Parti\u2019den olan adaylara de\u011fil, ayn\u0131 zamanda i\u015fyeri \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmeleri, ikamet yerleri ve (dini gruplar gibi) \u00fcyeliklere ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak di\u011fer yurtta\u015flar\u0131n adayl\u0131klar\u0131na izin verilecekti. Fakat bu son h\u00fck\u00fcm hi\u00e7bir zaman y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girmedi. Rekabete dayal\u0131 se\u00e7imler hi\u00e7bir zaman yap\u0131lamad\u0131.<\/p>\n

Yeni Anayasa\u2019n\u0131n bu demokratik y\u00f6n\u00fc Stalin\u2019in \u0131srarlar\u0131yla eklenmi\u015ftir. Stalin ve onun en yak\u0131n destek\u00e7ileri, inatla bu h\u00fck\u00fcmleri Anayasa\u2019da tutmak i\u00e7in m\u00fccadele etmi\u015fti. Ancak, Stalin ve destek\u00e7ileri, Parti\u2019nin Merkez Komitesi taraf\u0131ndan reddedildiklerinde ve Japon ve Alman fa\u015fizminin Sovyet H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ni devirmek i\u00e7in i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapt\u0131klar\u0131 ciddi komplolar\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla ya\u015fanan panikle kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131nda, direnememi\u015flerdi.<\/p>\n

Haziran 1934\u2019te, Politb\u00fcro, yeni bir anayasan\u0131n yaz\u0131lmas\u0131 g\u00f6revini Sovyet y\u00f6netiminin \u00f6nde gelen fig\u00fcr\u00fc Avel Enukidze\u2019ye verdi. Bir s\u00fcre sonra Enukidze, rekabete dayal\u0131, a\u00e7\u0131k oy sistemini \u00f6ng\u00f6ren bir se\u00e7im sistemi ile geri d\u00f6nd\u00fc. Stalin ise, Enukidze\u2019nin bu \u00f6nerisine kat\u0131lmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hemen a\u00e7\u0131klayarak, se\u00e7imin gizli yap\u0131lmas\u0131 \u0131srar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc (Zhukov, 2003, 116\u2013121).<\/p>\n

1 Mart 1936\u2019da Amerika\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6nde gelen gazetecilerinden Roy Howard\u2019a vermi\u015f oldu\u011fu m\u00fclakatta Stalin, Sovyet Anayasas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n gizli oya dayal\u0131 se\u00e7imleri garanti alt\u0131na alaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 deklare etti. Bu yeni Anayasan\u0131n garanti alt\u0131na alaca\u011f\u0131 se\u00e7im sistemi, k\u00f6yl\u00fclerin oyunun da i\u015f\u00e7iler kadar e\u015fit say\u0131laca\u011f\u0131, Bat\u0131\u2019da oldu\u011fu gibi direkt ve b\u00f6lgesel temelli olarak, t\u00fcm Sovyetlerin yurtta\u015flar\u0131n kendileri taraf\u0131ndan se\u00e7ilece\u011fi \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyordu.<\/p>\n

\u201cBu y\u0131l\u0131n sorununda yeni anayasam\u0131z b\u00fcy\u00fck bir ihtimalle kabul edilecektir. \u2026 hali haz\u0131rda ilan edildi\u011fi gibi bu yeni anayasaya g\u00f6re oy hakk\u0131, evrensel, e\u015fit, direkt ve gizli olarak yer alacakt\u0131r.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Bunun yan\u0131nda Stalin, t\u00fcm se\u00e7imlerin adayl\u0131 ve rekabete dayal\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da ifade etmi\u015ftir. Farkl\u0131 yurtta\u015f \u00f6rg\u00fctleri, Kom\u00fcnist Parti adaylar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 kendi adaylar\u0131yla yar\u0131\u015fabilecekti. Stalin Howard\u2019a, yurtta\u015flar\u0131n oy vermek istediklerinin d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalan adaylar\u0131n \u00fcst\u00fcn\u00fc \u00e7izece\u011fini anlatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Stalin, ayn\u0131 zamanda, adayl\u0131 ve rekabete dayal\u0131 se\u00e7imlerin b\u00fcrokrasiyle m\u00fccadelede \u00f6nemli bir yerinin oldu\u011funun da alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7izmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

\u201cSe\u00e7im yar\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n olmayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 m\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyorsunuz? Fakat olacak ve ben \u00e7ok canl\u0131 bir se\u00e7im kampanyas\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fcyorum. \u00dclkemizde k\u00f6t\u00fc \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan birka\u00e7 kurum yok… Bizim yeni se\u00e7im sistemimiz, t\u00fcm \u00f6rg\u00fctleri ve kurumlar\u0131 yeniden yap\u0131land\u0131rarak onlar\u0131 kendi i\u015flerini geli\u015ftirmeye zorlayacakt\u0131r. SSCB\u2019deki evrensel, e\u015fit, do\u011frudan ve gizli oy hakk\u0131, k\u00f6t\u00fc \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan y\u00f6netim organlar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 halk\u0131n elindeki bir kam\u00e7\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. \u0130nan\u0131yorum ki, yeni Sovyet Anayasam\u0131z, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en demokratik anayasas\u0131 olacakt\u0131r.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Stalin, oy hakk\u0131 elinden al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f olan Sovyet yurtta\u015flar\u0131na bu hakk\u0131n geri verilmesi konusunda \u0131srar etmi\u015ftir. Bunlar, eski toprak sahipleri gibi eskiden s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fcc\u00fc s\u0131n\u0131fa dahil olanlardan ve 1918-21 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda s\u00fcren \u0130\u00e7 Sava\u015f\u2019ta Bol\u015feviklere kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015fanlardan ve (bug\u00fcn ABD\u2019de oldu\u011fu gibi) baz\u0131 su\u00e7lardan h\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fc olanlardan olu\u015fuyordu. Oy hakk\u0131ndan mahrum b\u0131rak\u0131lanlar aras\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir yere sahip olan kulaklar ise, birka\u00e7 y\u0131l \u00f6ncesi kamula\u015ft\u0131rma hareketinin ana hedefi olan eski zengin k\u00f6yl\u00fclerdi.<\/p>\n

Stalin liderli\u011fi e\u011fer Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin halihaz\u0131rdaki y\u00f6netilme bi\u00e7imini de\u011fi\u015ftirmek istemeseydi, bu se\u00e7im reformlar\u0131 gerekmeyecekti. Stalin, Bol\u015fevik Parti\u2019nin 1917\u2019deki slogan\u0131 olan \u201cT\u00fcm iktidar Sovyetlere<\/em>\u201d anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131na geri d\u00f6nerek, Kom\u00fcnist Parti\u2019yi Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ni do\u011frudan y\u00f6netme i\u015finden ay\u0131rmak istiyordu.<\/p>\n

B\u00dcROKRAS\u0130YE KAR\u015eI M\u00dcCADELE<\/strong><\/p>\n

Stalin liderli\u011fi, ayn\u0131 zamanda, Parti\u2019nin rol\u00fc konusunda da kayg\u0131l\u0131yd\u0131. Ocak 1934\u2019teki 17. Parti Kongresi\u2019ne sunmu\u015f oldu\u011fu rapordan ba\u015flayarak, b\u00fcy\u00fck bir azimle b\u00fcrokratizme kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadeleyi Stalin\u2019in kendisi ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Parti liderleri, hem Sovyetlere kimin girdi\u011fine karar vererek, hem de bakanl\u0131klar\u0131n yapm\u0131\u015f olduklar\u0131 \u015feyleri \u00e7e\u015fitli bi\u00e7imlerde denetleyerek ya da g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irerek, y\u00f6netimi kontrol ediyorlard\u0131. Stalin, Molotov ve di\u011ferleri, bu yeni se\u00e7im sistemini \u201cb\u00fcrokratikle\u015fmeye kar\u015f\u0131 bir silah<\/em>\u201d olarak adland\u0131r\u0131yordu. 6 \u015eubat 1935\u2019teki 7. Sovyetler Kongresi\u2019ndeki konu\u015fmas\u0131nda Molotov, gizli se\u00e7imlerin \u201cb\u00fcrokratik unsurlara b\u00fcy\u00fck bir darbe indirece\u011fini ve bu unsurlara yararl\u0131 bir \u015fok etkisi sa\u011flayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131<\/em>\u201d ifade etmi\u015fti. (Zhukov, 2003, 124)<\/p>\n

Bakanlar\u0131n ve bakanl\u0131k personellerinin e\u011fer \u00fcretimde etkili olmak istiyorlarsa, sorumlu olduklar\u0131 i\u015flere dair bilgisi olmak zorundayd\u0131. Bu ifadeyle onlar\u0131n alanlar\u0131ndaki teknik e\u011fitim kastediliyordu. Fakat parti liderleri genellikle kariyerlerini sadece Parti\u2019deki pozisyonlar\u0131 arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla ilerletiyordu. Bu parti g\u00f6revlileri kontrol uyguluyorlard\u0131, ancak kendileri genellikle onlar\u0131 kontrol edebilecek teknik bilgi ve beceriden yoksundu.<\/p>\n

Stalin liderli\u011finin \u201cb\u00fcrokratizm<\/em>\u201d terimiyle kastetti\u011fi \u015fey, a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a bu konuydu. B\u00fcrokratizmi \u2013t\u00fcm Marksistler gibi\u2013 bir tehlike olarak g\u00f6rmelerine ra\u011fmen ayn\u0131 zamanda ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz bir \u015fey oldu\u011funa da inan\u0131yorlard\u0131. Hatta, sosyalist toplumda Parti\u2019nin rol\u00fcn\u00fc de\u011fi\u015ftirmekle bu problemin \u00fcstesinden gelebileceklerini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015flerdi. Stalin ve Parti liderli\u011findeki taraftarlar\u0131n\u0131n Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nde ba\u015flatmay\u0131 istedikleri demokrasi kavram\u0131, Parti\u2019nin toplum i\u00e7indeki rol\u00fcn\u00fcn niteliksel olarak de\u011fi\u015fimini gerekli k\u0131l\u0131yordu.<\/p>\n

\u201cAra\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar\u0131n eri\u015febilece\u011fi bu belgeler, 1930\u2019lar\u0131n sonunda hali haz\u0131rda kararla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, \u00fclke ya\u015fam\u0131nda partinin temel rol\u00fcn\u00fcn s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve Parti ile devletin birbirinden ayr\u0131lmas\u0131 giri\u015fimlerini anlamam\u0131z\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yor.<\/em>\u201d (Zhukov, 2000, 8)<\/p>\n

1936 Anayasas\u0131n\u0131n 3. Maddesi \u015f\u00f6yle diyordu: \u201cSSCB i\u00e7inde t\u00fcm iktidar \u015fehir ve kasabalarda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan halklara aittir ve \u0130\u015f\u00e7i Temsilcileri Sovyetleri taraf\u0131ndan temsil edilir.<\/em>\u201d Kom\u00fcnist Parti\u2019den ise, 126. Maddede \u015f\u00f6yle bahsediliyordu: \u201cSosyalist sistemin geli\u015fmesi ve g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi i\u00e7in y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen i\u015f\u00e7i m\u00fccadelesinin \u00f6nc\u00fcs\u00fc ve hem devlet hem de halk nezdinde t\u00fcm i\u015f\u00e7i \u00f6rg\u00fctlerinin \u00f6nc\u00fc \u00e7ekirde\u011fidir.<\/em>\u201d Bu ifade, Parti\u2019nin devletin y\u00fcr\u00fctme ve y\u00f6netim organlar\u0131ndan biri oldu\u011funu de\u011fil, \u00f6rg\u00fctlere \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fck etmesi gerekti\u011fini s\u00f6yler (1936 Anayasas\u0131; Zhukov, 2000, 29-30).<\/p>\n

Haziran 1937\u2019deki Merkez Komitesi toplant\u0131s\u0131nda yeni anayasa tasla\u011f\u0131 \u00fczerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015fanlardan biri olan Iakov A. Iakovlev, rekabete dayal\u0131 gizli se\u00e7im \u00f6nerisinin Stalin\u2019in kendisi taraf\u0131ndan bizzat haz\u0131rland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir. Ancak bu \u00f6neri, Birinci Sekreterler ve b\u00f6lgesel parti liderlerinin geni\u015f ve \u00f6rt\u00fcl\u00fc muhalefetiyle kar\u015f\u0131la\u015f\u0131r. Howard\u2019\u0131n r\u00f6portaj\u0131ndan sonra, bir\u00e7o\u011fu Politb\u00fcro taraf\u0131ndan do\u011frudan kontrol edilen merkezi gazetelerde, Stalin\u2019in rekabete dayal\u0131 se\u00e7im demecini destekleyen, hatta s\u00f6zel olarak \u00f6ven bir yaz\u0131 bulunmamakt\u0131r. 10 Mart 1936\u2019da Pravda\u2019da sadece bir makale yay\u0131nlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r; o da bu t\u00fcr se\u00e7imlerden bahsetmemektedir.<\/p>\n

Bundan tarih\u00e7i Iurii N. Zhukov \u015fu sonucu \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131yor:<\/p>\n

\u201cBu, sadece \u015fu anlama gelir: Sadece geni\u015f liderlik [B\u00f6lgesel Birinci Sekreterler] taraf\u0131ndan de\u011fil ayn\u0131 zamanda baz\u0131 Merkez Komite organlar\u0131, \u00f6zellikle Stetskii ve Tal\u2019\u0131n alt\u0131ndaki Ajit-prop organ\u0131, Stalin\u2019in bu yenilik\u00e7i \u00f6nerisini kabul etmedi, onaylamad\u0131, hatta sadece bi\u00e7imsel de olsa adayl\u0131 se\u00e7imleri bir\u00e7ok ki\u015fi i\u00e7in tehlikeli buldu. Pravda taraf\u0131ndan vurgulanan Stalin\u2019in bu s\u00f6zlerinin ard\u0131ndan Birinci Sekreterler \u2013b\u00f6lge komiteleri ve kent, b\u00f6lgesel ve ulusal kom\u00fcnist partilerin merkez komiteleri\u2013 bu \u00f6neriyi kendi pozisyonlar\u0131na ve ger\u00e7ek g\u00fc\u00e7lerine do\u011frudan bir tehdit olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fcler.<\/em>\u201d (Zhukov, 2003, 211)<\/p>\n

Parti\u2019nin k\u0131demli liderleri, genellikle zor zamanlar\u0131n emektarlar\u0131yd\u0131lar. \u00c7arl\u0131k zaman\u0131n\u0131n tehlikeli g\u00fcnlerinde, devrim, i\u00e7 sava\u015f ve kamula\u015ft\u0131rma d\u00f6neminde, yani kom\u00fcnist olman\u0131n tehlikeli ve zor oldu\u011fu bir d\u00f6nemde \u00f6nc\u00fc g\u00f6revler \u00fcstlenmi\u015flerdi. Bir\u00e7o\u011fu \u00e7ok az e\u011fitimliydi. \u00d6yle g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor ki, bunlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu ne kendini e\u011fiterek \u201ckendi yeniden yap\u0131lanmalar\u0131n\u0131<\/em>\u201d sa\u011flayacak g\u00fc\u00e7teydiler, ne de bu konuda istekliydiler.<\/p>\n

Bu adamlar\u0131n hepsi uzun zamand\u0131r Stalin\u2019in politikalar\u0131n\u0131n destekleyicisiydiler. Bu eski t\u00fcfekler, y\u00fcz binlerce kulak ailesinin s\u0131n\u0131r d\u0131\u015f\u0131 edildi\u011fi d\u00f6nemde k\u0131tl\u0131k d\u00f6ng\u00fcs\u00fcnden \u00e7\u0131kmak i\u00e7in bir ad\u0131m olan tar\u0131m\u0131n kolektifle\u015ftirilmesini uygulam\u0131\u015flard\u0131. Ge\u00e7erli vah\u015fi ko\u015fullar (d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck \u00fccret ve bu \u00fccretle al\u0131nabilecek \u00e7ok az \u00fcr\u00fcn, yetersiz beslenme, yetersiz sa\u011fl\u0131k hizmetleri, yoksul hanelerin sefil ya\u015fant\u0131s\u0131) alt\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesi beklenen sanayile\u015fmenin \u00e7\u00f6kmesinden bunlar sorumluydular.<\/p>\n

\u015eimdi Stalin, bu eski t\u00fcfekleri, Sovyet politikalar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 olduklar\u0131 i\u00e7in oy haklar\u0131 elinden al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f ki\u015filerin se\u00e7ime kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve oy hakk\u0131 tan\u0131nmas\u0131 ile tehdit ediyordu. Bir\u00e7oklar\u0131n\u0131 korkutan \u015fey, kendi adaylar\u0131na ya da Parti destekli adaylara kar\u015f\u0131 oy kullanmalar\u0131yd\u0131.<\/p>\n

Stalin\u2019in kendisi bunu daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde \u015f\u00f6yle ortaya koymu\u015ftur:<\/p>\n

\u201cE\u011fer burada ya da orada insanlar d\u00fc\u015fman g\u00fc\u00e7lerini se\u00e7ecekse, bu bizim ajitatif i\u015flerimizin k\u00f6t\u00fc organize edildi\u011fi anlam\u0131na gelir ve biz de bu rezaleti tamamen hak etmi\u015f oluruz.<\/em>\u201d (Stalin, 1936b; Zhukov, 2003, 293)<\/p>\n

Stalin\u2019in tutumu buydu, ancak Birinci Sekreterler buna kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Sekretarya \u00fcyeleri, Stalin\u2019in \u00f6nerisini proletarya diktat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fcn bir ihlali olarak m\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015flerdi? Onlar, bu \u00f6neriyi demokrasi kavram\u0131 alt\u0131nda kapitalizme verilmi\u015f b\u00fcy\u00fck bir taviz olarak m\u0131 ele ald\u0131lar? Kapitalizm yanl\u0131s\u0131 partilerin b\u00fcy\u00fck bir avantaja sahip oldu\u011fu ko\u015fullar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda \u201cdemokratik<\/em>\u201d kapitalist devletler bile kapitalizm d\u00fc\u015fmanlar\u0131 olarak an\u0131lanlar\u0131n \u00f6zg\u00fcrce se\u00e7imlere kat\u0131lmalar\u0131na izin vermiyorlard\u0131. Hatta bu devletlerde sistemin kendisi \u2013yani kapitalizm\u2013 hi\u00e7bir zaman herkesin elde edebilece\u011fi bir \u015fey de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n

KOMPLO: MUHAL\u0130F BLOK<\/strong><\/p>\n

25 Kas\u0131m 1936\u2019da ba\u015flayan Kongre s\u0131ras\u0131nda, yeni Anayasa ile ilgilenirken Sovyet liderli\u011fi, geni\u015f \u00e7apl\u0131 Moskova Duru\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n ilk ikisi aras\u0131ndaki d\u00f6nemdeydi. A\u011fustos 1936\u2019da, Grigorii Zinoviev ve Lev Kamenev di\u011ferleriyle birlikte yarg\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ocak 1937\u2019deki \u0130kinci mahkemeye ise, yak\u0131n d\u00f6neme kadar A\u011f\u0131r Sanayi Komiser Yard\u0131mc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 yapan Iurii Piatakov\u2019un \u00f6nderli\u011findeki ba\u015fl\u0131ca Tro\u00e7ki takip\u00e7ileri de dahil olmu\u015ftu (Zhukov, 2003, 291).<\/p>\n

1936, 1937 ve 1938 y\u0131llar\u0131ndaki halka a\u00e7\u0131k Moskova davalar\u0131nda, savc\u0131, 1932\u2019de \u015fekillenmi\u015f, Kirov cinayetini yapm\u0131\u015f ve Stalin liderli\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 komploya devam etmi\u015f bu \u00e7e\u015fitli gruplardan olu\u015fmu\u015f gizli bir su\u00e7 blo\u011funun oldu\u011funu iddia etmi\u015ftir. S\u00fcrg\u00fcnde olan Leon Tro\u00e7ki ise, kendisinin ve takip\u00e7ilerinin b\u00f6yle bir blo\u011fa dahil oldu\u011funu \u015fiddetli bir \u015fekilde reddetmi\u015fti. Fakat, 1980 y\u0131l\u0131nda, d\u00f6neminde d\u00fcnyan\u0131n \u00f6nde gelen Tro\u00e7kist tarih\u00e7isi Pierre Brou\u00e9, bu blo\u011fun ger\u00e7ekte var oldu\u011funu ve Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin bunu onaylad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 (Brou\u00e9, 1980).<\/p>\n

1 Aral\u0131k 1934\u2019de kent Parti Komitelerinin ve Leningrad b\u00f6lgesinin Birinci Sekreteri olan Sergei M. Kirov, Leningrad\u2019daki Smolny Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc\u2019nde bulunan Parti merkezinde \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Stalin \u00f6nderli\u011findeki Sovyet H\u00fck\u00fcmeti, soru\u015fturmalar sonucunda, Zinovyevci gizli bir grup ad\u0131na hareket eden Leonid Vasilevich Nikolaev\u2019in bu suikast\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fini belirtmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

Tro\u00e7ki, Stalin\u2019in yalan s\u00f6yledi\u011fini iddia etmi\u015ftir. Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019in ve sonras\u0131nda Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un adamlar\u0131, gizli bir Zinovyevci grup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, Nikolaev\u2019in kendi ba\u015f\u0131na hareket eden bir \u00a0 katil oldu\u011funu iddia etmi\u015flerdir. Bat\u0131l\u0131 anti-kom\u00fcnist ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar ise, ya Kru\u015f\u00e7ev ve Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un s\u00f6ylediklerini tekrarlam\u0131\u015f ya da Stalin\u2019in Kirov\u2019un \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclmesini planlam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011funu iddia etmi\u015flerdir. Oysa, Harvard Tro\u00e7ki ar\u015fivleri ve eski Sovyet ar\u015fivlerinden elde edilen kan\u0131tlar sayesinde, Stalin d\u00f6nemi polisi ve savc\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n hakl\u0131 oldu\u011funu biz bug\u00fcn biliyoruz (Furr, 2013).<\/p>\n

1936 A\u011fustos\u2019undaki Moskova Davas\u0131\u2019nda Zinovyev ve Kamenev, Kirov cinayetindeki i\u015fbirli\u011fini itiraf etmi\u015flerdir. Onlar, Tro\u00e7kist, Zinovyevci ve di\u011ferlerinden olu\u015fan bu muhalif blo\u011fun SSCB\u2019deki iktidar\u0131 zor yoluyla ele ge\u00e7irmek istediklerini a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ifade etmi\u015flerdir. Di\u011fer Tro\u00e7kistler ise, Stalin\u2019in de dahil oldu\u011fu Sovyet liderlerine y\u00f6nelik suikast planlar\u0131n\u0131 itiraf etmi\u015flerdir.<\/p>\n

1936\u2019daki Moskova Davas\u0131\u2019nda san\u0131klar, bu blo\u011fun Tro\u00e7kistler ve Sa\u011fc\u0131lardan olu\u015fan paralel bir liderli\u011fe sahip oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Tro\u00e7kistlerin liderleri olarak Karl Radek ve Iurii Piatakov, Sa\u011fc\u0131lar\u0131n liderleri olarak da Mikhail Tomsky, Aleksei Rykov ve Nikolai Bukharin\u2019in ad\u0131 verilmi\u015ftir (Mahkeme Tutanaklar\u0131, 1936).<\/p>\n

1936 Eyl\u00fcl ve Aral\u0131k aylar\u0131 aras\u0131nda Radek, Piatakov ve bunlara kat\u0131lan di\u011ferleri, Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin Almanya, Japonya ve SSCB i\u00e7indeki anti-Sovyet ve fa\u015fizm yanl\u0131s\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerle birlikte planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 komplolar\u0131n detaylar\u0131n\u0131 ortaya d\u00f6km\u00fc\u015flerdi. Ocak 1937\u2019deki \u0130kinci Moskova Davas\u0131\u2019nda san\u0131klar, Alman ve Japon deste\u011fi kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin iktidar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irerek, SSCB\u2019de sosyalizmi ortadan kald\u0131rma planlar\u0131n\u0131 detayl\u0131ca anlatm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Bu san\u0131klar, Buharin, Rykov ve Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin planlar\u0131ndan tamamen haberdar olan blok \u00fcyesi Sa\u011fc\u0131lar\u0131n bu plana dahil oldu\u011funu itiraf etmi\u015flerdir (Mahkeme Tutanaklar\u0131, 1937).<\/p>\n

Tarihin en uzun toplant\u0131s\u0131 olan 1937 \u015eubat-Mart ay\u0131ndaki Merkez Komite Toplant\u0131s\u0131 iki hafta kadar s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Bu toplant\u0131, Parti \u00f6nderli\u011finin kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya oldu\u011fu \u00e7eli\u015fkili g\u00f6revleri dramatize etmi\u015fti: i\u00e7 d\u00fc\u015fmanlara kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele ve yeni Anayasa alt\u0131nda gizli ve adayl\u0131 se\u00e7imlere haz\u0131rl\u0131k ihtiyac\u0131. Sovyet iktidar\u0131n\u0131 devirmeyi ama\u00e7layan komplocu gruplar\u0131n daha fazlas\u0131n\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmak i\u00e7in polisin harekete ge\u00e7mesi gerekiyordu. Fakat ger\u00e7ek demokratik h\u00fck\u00fcmet se\u00e7imleri ve parti i\u00e7i demokrasiyi geli\u015ftirmek (bu konu Politb\u00fcro\u2019da tekrar tekrar Stalin\u2019e en yak\u0131n ki\u015filer taraf\u0131ndan vurgulan\u0131yordu) i\u00e7in bunun tersi gerekiyordu: \u00f6zele\u015ftiri ve ele\u015ftiriye a\u00e7\u0131k olma ve s\u0131radan parti \u00fcyelerine liderlik edecek ki\u015filerin gizli se\u00e7imlerle belirlenmesi.<\/p>\n

Leningrad parti \u00f6nderi Andrei Jdanov, \u00fclke ve parti i\u00e7inde daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir demokrasi ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131, hem parti \u00fcyeleri hem de parti \u00fcyesi olmayan kitlelerle daha yak\u0131n ba\u011f kurarak b\u00fcrokrasiye kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele etmek gerekti\u011fini \u015f\u00f6yle ifade etmi\u015ftir:<\/p>\n

\u201cBu yeni se\u00e7im sistemi, bizim Sovyet \u00f6rg\u00fctlerimizin i\u015flerindeki bozukluklar\u0131n, b\u00fcrokratik eksikliklerin, b\u00fcrokratik organlar\u0131n tasfiyesi ve Sovyet organlar\u0131n\u0131n i\u015flerinin iyile\u015ftirilmesi y\u00f6n\u00fcnde g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir etkiye sahip olacakt\u0131r. Ve bu yetersizlikler, sizin de bildi\u011finiz gibi, olduk\u00e7a m\u00fchimdir. Bizim parti organlar\u0131m\u0131z se\u00e7im m\u00fccadelesine haz\u0131r olmak zorundad\u0131r. Se\u00e7imlerde biz d\u00fc\u015fman ajitasyonuyla ve d\u00fc\u015fman adaylarla ilgilenmek zorunda kalaca\u011f\u0131z.<\/em>\u201d (Zhukov, 2003, 343)<\/p>\n

Jdanov parti-i\u00e7i demokrasi i\u00e7in daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir konu\u015fma yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

\u201cBu, a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan yukar\u0131ya t\u00fcm parti organlar\u0131n\u0131n gizli oylama ile yeniden se\u00e7imi, parti organlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fczenli olarak kendi \u00f6rg\u00fctlerine rapor vermesi, kat\u0131 parti disiplini, az\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funluk taraf\u0131ndan tahakk\u00fcm\u00fc ve y\u00fcksek parti organlar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcn parti \u00fcyeleri \u00fczerinde ko\u015fulsuz ve zorunlu kararlar\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelir. Jdanov, parti b\u00fcrolar\u0131na se\u00e7im yerine atamalar yap\u0131lmas\u0131ndan \u015fikayet etmi\u015f, \u00f6nemli mevkilere adaylar\u0131n kapal\u0131 kap\u0131lar ard\u0131nda, \u2018aile d\u00fczeni i\u00e7inde\u2019 belirlenmesini ele\u015ftirmi\u015fti. Jdanov \u2018aile\u2019 dedi\u011finde Stalin, \u2018bu bir anla\u015fma\u2019 (sgovar, yani keliminin tam anlam\u0131yla bir evlilik anla\u015fmas\u0131) diyerek araya girmi\u015ftir. Stalin\u2019in bu \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131 fiili b\u00f6lgesel a\u015firet liderlerine kar\u015f\u0131 fiili bir sava\u015f ilan\u0131yd\u0131. Onlar\u0131n Jdanov\u2019un raporuna verdi\u011fi tepki (ki bu tepki ilkin g\u00f6r\u00fclmemi\u015f derecede \u00f6fkeli bir sessizlik \u015feklindeydi) bu liderlerin \u00f6fkeli olduklar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steriyordu.<\/em>\u201d (Getty, 2013a, 77)<\/p>\n

Parti\u2019de Stalin \u00f6nderli\u011fini temsil eden Nikolai Shvernik, sendikal demokrasi i\u00e7in g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n

Shvernik, sendikalar\u0131n da, t\u0131pk\u0131 Parti gibi, i\u00e7 demokrasiden yoksun oldu\u011funu savunuyordu.<\/p>\n

\u201cShvernik, \u2018T\u00fcm samimiyetimle ve direkt olarak \u015funu s\u00f6yl\u00fcyorum ki, evet, sendikalar \u00e7ok k\u00f6t\u00fc durumda\u2019 diyordu. \u0130lk Be\u015f Y\u0131ll\u0131k Plan\u2019la yeni sanayinin geli\u015fmesiyle ve binlerce yeni i\u015f alan\u0131n\u0131n yarat\u0131lmas\u0131yla birlikte 47 olan sendika say\u0131s\u0131 165\u2019e \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Her kademedeki pozisyonlar se\u00e7imle de\u011fil atama ile doldurulmu\u015ftu. Shvernik konu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 se\u00e7imlerin sadece parti i\u00e7in de\u011fil ayn\u0131 zamanda sendikalar i\u00e7in de gerekli oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yleyerek bitirmi\u015fti.<\/em>\u201d (Goldman, 2007, 126)<\/p>\n

\u00a0PART\u0130 SEKRETERLER\u0130N\u0130N SE\u00c7\u0130M KORKUSU<\/strong><\/p>\n

Jdanov\u2019un raporu \u201cd\u00fc\u015fmanlar<\/em>\u201d tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131yla bo\u011fulmu\u015ftur. Baz\u0131 Birinci Sekreterler, bu rapora, Sovyet iktidar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 olanlar\u0131n se\u00e7ime en iyi haz\u0131rlananlar oldu\u011fu ya da olabilece\u011fini s\u00f6yleyerek uyar\u0131yla cevap vermi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

\u201cTart\u0131\u015fman\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131ndan beri Stalin anla\u015f\u0131lamamaktan korkuyordu. \u00d6yle g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyordu ki, Stalin\u2019in tart\u0131\u015fmak istedi\u011fi \u015feyler, raporda sadece kendi istediklerini duyan Merkez Komite \u00fcyelerinin isteksizli\u011finin ve kavray\u0131\u015fs\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n sa\u011f\u0131r duvar\u0131na \u00e7arpm\u0131\u015f gibiydi. Tart\u0131\u015fmaya kat\u0131lan 24 ki\u015fiden 15\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak \u2018halk d\u00fc\u015fmanlar\u0131n\u0131\u2019, yani Tro\u00e7kistleri konu\u015fmu\u015ftu. Bu ki\u015filer Jdanov ve Molotov taraf\u0131ndan haz\u0131rlanan rapor sonras\u0131nda samimiyetle ve sald\u0131rgan bir \u015fekilde konu\u015fmu\u015flard\u0131. B\u00fct\u00fcn problemleri d\u00fc\u015fmanlar\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmaya indirgemi\u015flerdi. Ve hi\u00e7biri, Stalin\u2019in Parti \u00f6rg\u00fctlerindeki eksiklikler ve daha \u00fcst\u00fcn bir Sovyet i\u00e7in se\u00e7imlere haz\u0131rl\u0131k konusundaki ba\u015fl\u0131ca tart\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 hat\u0131rlamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131<\/em>\u201d (Zhukov, 2003, 357).<\/p>\n

Birinci Sekreterler de dahil Parti g\u00f6revlileri i\u00e7in en endi\u015fe verici \u015fey, Stalin\u2019in \u015fu \u00f6nerisiydi: Alt\u0131 ayl\u0131k e\u011fitimlere kat\u0131l\u0131rken kendi yerlerine ge\u00e7ecek iki kadroyu se\u00e7me gereklili\u011fi. Yerlerine ge\u00e7ecek yedek g\u00f6revliler, Parti sekreterlerini korkutmu\u015f olabilirdi. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu alt\u0131 ay boyunca yerlerine ge\u00e7ecek g\u00f6revliler, b\u00fcrokrasinin temel \u00f6zelli\u011fi olan \u2018aile<\/em>\u2019 deste\u011fini k\u0131rarak yeniden bu g\u00f6reve atanabilirlerdi. (Zhukov, 2003, 362). Stalin\u2019in bu \u00f6nerisi g\u00f6zard\u0131 edildi ve bu e\u011fitim hi\u00e7bir zaman ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilemedi.<\/p>\n

Devam\u0131ndaki birka\u00e7 ay i\u00e7inde ise, Stalin ve onun en yak\u0131n destek\u00e7ileri, Merkez Komite \u00fcyelerinin dikkatini \u2013onlar i\u00e7in en b\u00fcy\u00fck me\u015fguliyet olan\u2013 i\u00e7 d\u00fc\u015fman av\u0131ndan tekrar Parti i\u00e7i b\u00fcrokrasiyle m\u00fccadeleye ve Sovyet se\u00e7imine haz\u0131rl\u0131\u011fa \u00e7evirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131lar. Bu arada \u201cB\u00f6lgesel parti liderleri se\u00e7imleri de\u011fi\u015ftirmek veya durdurmak i\u00e7in parti disiplini i\u00e7inde (bazen de d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalarak) ellerinden gelen her \u015feyi yapt\u0131lar<\/em>\u201d (Getty 2002, 126; Zhukov 2003, 367-371).<\/p>\n

Fakat \u00e7ok karanl\u0131k bir d\u00f6nem ba\u015f g\u00f6stermi\u015fti. 1937 Mart ay\u0131n\u0131n sonunda eski NKVD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Genrikh Iagoda tutukland\u0131. Nisan ay\u0131nda ise, Birinci ve \u0130kinci Moskova Davalar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n ana hedefi olan gizli muhalif blokun i\u00e7inde \u00f6nemli bir rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 itiraf etmeye ba\u015flad\u0131 (Genrikh Iagoda 1997).<\/p>\n

Politb\u00fcro, 1937 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Haziran ay\u0131nda yap\u0131lacak Genel Kurul\u2019da ana g\u00fcndem maddesini Anayasa reformu olarak planlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ancak, Haziran ay\u0131na gelindi\u011finde, eski NKVD \u015fefi ve \u00fcst d\u00fczey askeri liderlerin iktidar\u0131 y\u0131kmak ve h\u00fck\u00fcmet liderlerini \u00f6ld\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in kurduklar\u0131 kumpas\u0131n ke\u015ffedilmesi b\u00fct\u00fcn siyasi atmosferi de\u011fi\u015ftirdi.<\/p>\n

2 Haziran\u2019da Askeri Sovyetlerin geni\u015fletilmi\u015f oturumunda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada Stalin, son zamanlarda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f komplo serilerinin s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir \u015fekilde halledildi\u011fini anlatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u015eubat-Mart Plenumu\u2019nda, Stalin ve onun Politb\u00fcro\u2019daki destek\u00e7ileri Birinci Sekreterlerin a\u011f\u0131r basan i\u00e7 d\u00fc\u015fmanlar kayg\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 asgariye indirgemi\u015fti. Ancak bu durum \u201cyava\u015f fakat belirleyici bir \u015fekilde onun [Stalin\u2019in] kontrol\u00fcnden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131yordu.<\/em>\u201d (Stalin, 1937; Zhukov 2003, B\u00f6l\u00fcm 16, 411)<\/p>\n

5 Mart 1937\u2019de yap\u0131lan Merkez Komitesi \u015eubat-Mart Plenumu ile 23 Haziran\u2019daki Plenum aras\u0131nda ge\u00e7en s\u00fcrede, 18 Merkez Komite \u00fcyesi ve 20 aday \u00fcye anti-Sovyet komplolara i\u015ftirakten tutukland\u0131. Bu \u00fcyelerin ihrac\u0131 ise, Haziran Plenumu\u2019nda onayland\u0131.<\/p>\n

KOMPLOLAR GER\u00c7EKT\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n

17 Haziran 1937\u2019de, Merkez Komitesi Haziran Plenumu \u00f6ncesinde, Iagoda\u2019n\u0131n yerine NKVD Komiseri olan Nikolai Yevzhov\u2019a, Bat\u0131 Sibirya \u015fefi S. N. Mironov\u2019un bir mesaj\u0131 ula\u015ft\u0131. Bu mesajda, Japon gizli servisi ile ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131 ve y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 olabilecek ayaklanma tehdidinden s\u00f6z ediliyordu. Mironov, Bat\u0131 Sibirya Birinci Parti Sekreteri olan Rober I. Eikhe\u2019in, \u00fc\u00e7 ki\u015filik bir komisyon olu\u015fturularak bu tehdidin ara\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve ortadan kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 talebini iletiyordu (Furr 2016, 48; Khaustov ve Samuelson, 2009, 332-333).<\/p>\n

19 Haziran 1937\u2019de Stalin, Meksika\u2019da s\u00fcrg\u00fcnde olan Tro\u00e7ki taraf\u0131ndan Sovyet H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ne g\u00f6nderilmi\u015f bir telgraf ald\u0131. Bu telgrafta Tro\u00e7ki, Stalin\u2019in politikalar\u0131n\u0131n \u201ci\u00e7 ve d\u0131\u015f \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015fe<\/em>\u201d neden olabilece\u011fini yaz\u0131yordu. Telgraf\u0131n \u00fcst\u00fcne Stalin imza at\u0131p \u015f\u00f6yle yazm\u0131\u015ft\u0131: \u201c\u00c7irkin casus! Hitler\u2019in y\u00fczs\u00fcz ajan\u0131<\/em>\u201d. Ayr\u0131ca bu s\u00f6zler, Molotof, Voroshilov, Mikoyan ve Jdanov taraf\u0131ndan imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. T\u00fcm bu ki\u015filer, ger\u00e7ekte Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin Almanlarla anla\u015fma yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131na inan\u0131yorlard\u0131. Tuha\u00e7evski\u2019nin itiraflar\u0131 ve Mare\u015fal Budennyi\u2019nin Tuha\u00e7evski davas\u0131 konusundaki yorumlar\u0131ndan b\u00f6yle bir komplonun varl\u0131\u011f\u0131na dair \u015f\u00fcphe bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rebiliriz (Furr, 2009, 15).<\/p>\n

ANT\u0130-SOVYET KOMPLOLAR<\/strong><\/p>\n

Haziran 1937 Merkez Komite Plenumu tutanaklar\u0131n\u0131n hi\u00e7biri yay\u0131nlanmad\u0131. Ancak Iurii Zhukov\u2019un, baz\u0131 tutanak ar\u015fivlerinden geni\u015f\u00e7e al\u0131nt\u0131lar yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 metinler var. Ayn\u0131 zamanda Yevzhov\u2019un yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 yorumlar\u0131n \u201c\u00f6zeti<\/em>\u201d bulunuyor. Bu metin 23 Haziran tarihli oldu\u011fundan, Yevzhov\u2019un yorumlar\u0131 Plenum\u2019un ilk raporunu olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. Yevzhov\u2019un raporu olduk\u00e7a \u00fcrk\u00fct\u00fcc\u00fcyd\u00fc. O, bir d\u00fcz\u00fcne aktif komplolar\u0131 listelerken \u015fu sonuca var\u0131yordu: \u201cS\u00f6z konusu bu liste, sadece \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli gruplar\u0131 i\u00e7eren bir listedir<\/em>\u201d (Petrov and Iansen, 2008, 293-294).<\/p>\n

SE\u00c7\u0130MLER<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iakovlev ve Molotov Parti liderlerini, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Sovyet se\u00e7imlerini organize edememi\u015f olmakla ele\u015ftiriyorlard\u0131. Molotov, g\u00fcn\u00fcn g\u00f6revlerine haz\u0131r de\u011fillerse, onurlu devrimcileri bile engel olmaktan \u00e7\u0131karmak gereklili\u011finin alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7izmi\u015fti. O, Sovyet yetkililerinin \u201cikinci s\u0131n\u0131f i\u015f\u00e7iler<\/em>\u201d (\u00f6nemsiz ki\u015filer) olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 vurgulam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Belli ki, baz\u0131 Parti liderleri onlar\u0131 \u00f6yle g\u00f6r\u00fcyordu.<\/p>\n

G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze kadar ula\u015fm\u0131\u015f Merkez Komite Plenumu g\u00fcndemine g\u00f6re, Iakovlev 27 Haziran\u2019da konu\u015fmu\u015ftu. Bu konu\u015fmas\u0131nda, Birinci Sekreterlerin Parti g\u00f6revlilerinin atama yoluyla de\u011fil gizli se\u00e7imler yoluyla belirlenmesi konusundaki ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ele\u015ftirmi\u015fti. Iakovlev, Sovyetlere delege olarak se\u00e7ilen Parti \u00fcyelerinin, Sovyetler d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki Parti gruplar\u0131n\u0131n veya \u00fcst d\u00fczey Parti yetkililerinin disiplini alt\u0131nda olmamas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini vurgulam\u0131\u015f ve nas\u0131l oy kullan\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 anlatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Iakovlev, \u201c\u00e7\u00fcr\u00fcm\u00fc\u015f veya b\u00fcrokratikle\u015fmi\u015f ki\u015filerin \u00e7ok zengin ve yeni kadro kaynaklar\u0131yla de\u011fi\u015ftirilmesi<\/em>\u201d ihtiyac\u0131na \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde i\u015faret etmi\u015fti. T\u00fcm bu ifadeler, Birinci Sekreterlere kar\u015f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k bir sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 ortaya koyuyordu (Zhukov, 2003, 424-427; Zhukov, 2000, 39-40, ar\u015fiv niteli\u011fi ta\u015f\u0131yan belgelerden al\u0131nt\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r).<\/p>\n

Zhukov taraf\u0131ndan al\u0131nt\u0131lanan Stalin\u2019in \u015fu yorumu belki de en belirgin if\u015fayd\u0131:<\/p>\n

\u201cTart\u0131\u015fman\u0131n sonunda, konu oy say\u0131m\u0131nda daha sakin ve yans\u0131z bir y\u00f6ntem bulunmas\u0131 sorununa geldi\u011finde, Stalin, Bat\u0131\u2019da \u00e7ok partili sistem sayesinde b\u00f6yle bir sorunun olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yledi. Hemen ard\u0131ndan, Stalin birden \u2013bu tip toplant\u0131larda tuhaf kar\u015f\u0131lanacak\u2013 bir ifade kulland\u0131: \u2018Bizde farkl\u0131 siyasi partiler yok. Neyse ki ya da maalesef bizde sadece tek parti var.\u2019 [vurgular Zhukov\u2019a ait] Ve Stalin, sadece ge\u00e7ici bir \u00f6nlem olarak, se\u00e7imlerde tarafs\u0131z g\u00f6zlem amac\u0131yla, Bol\u015fevik Parti hari\u00e7<\/strong>, var olan t\u00fcm sosyal \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmelerden temsilcilerin kullan\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nerdi\u2026 Parti otokrasisine kar\u015f\u0131 meydan okuma ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015fti<\/em>\u201d (Zhukov, 2003, 430-431; Zhukov, 200, 38).<\/p>\n

Anayasa sonunda taslak haline getirildi ve ilk se\u00e7imlerin tarihi de 12 Aral\u0131k 1937 olarak belirlendi. B\u00f6ylece Stalin liderli\u011fi b\u00fcrokrasiye kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadeleyi ve kitlelerle ba\u011f kurmay\u0131 yeniden te\u015fvik etti. Fakat t\u00fcm bunlar\u0131, Merkez Komite\u2019den 26\u2019s\u0131n\u0131n benzeri g\u00f6r\u00fclmemi\u015f bir bi\u00e7imde ihra\u00e7 edilmesi ve ihra\u00e7 edilenlerin 19\u2019unun da ihanet ve kar\u015f\u0131 devrimci eylemlerle su\u00e7lanmas\u0131 takip etti (Zhukov, 2003, 430).<\/p>\n

Parti \u00e7ok \u015fiddetli bir kriz i\u00e7indeydi ve etkinliklerin planland\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesini beklemek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildi. Bu, demokratik \u2013gizli oylama yap\u0131lan, herkesin oy kullanabilece\u011fi ve aday olabilece\u011fi\u2013 se\u00e7imlere haz\u0131rlanma d\u00f6nemi i\u00e7in en k\u00f6t\u00fc atmosferdi.<\/p>\n

BASKILARIN NEDENLER\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n

SSCB tarih\u00e7ilerinin bir\u00e7o\u011fu gibi, Iurii Zhukov da, ger\u00e7ek komplolar\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6z ard\u0131 etmi\u015ftir. Zhukov, NKVD\u2019nin as\u0131l olarak, oy kullanma da dahil olmak \u00fczere, vatanda\u015fl\u0131k haklar\u0131 geri verilmi\u015f olan ve oylar\u0131yla Birinci Sekreterlerin iktidar\u0131n\u0131n devaml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131na en b\u00fcy\u00fck tehlikeyi te\u015fkil edecek ki\u015fileri hedefledi\u011fine inan\u0131yordu. Bu, ger\u00e7ekten de baz\u0131 b\u00f6lgesel Parti liderlerinin motivasyonlar\u0131ndan biri olabilir. Ancak bu basit\u00e7e varsay\u0131lamayacak bir \u015feydi ve bu varsay\u0131m\u0131 destekleyecek herhangi bir kan\u0131ta \u015fimdilik sahip de\u011filiz.<\/p>\n

Di\u011fer tarih\u00e7iler ise, bu kitlesel bask\u0131ya Stalin\u2019in \u00f6nderlik etti\u011fini iddia ederek, onun Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin olas\u0131 i\u015fgali halinde, bir \u2018Be\u015finci Kol<\/em>\u2019 gibi hareket edip hainlik yapabilecek herkesi \u00f6ld\u00fcrmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015flerdir. Baz\u0131lar\u0131 ise, Stalin\u2019in olas\u0131 t\u00fcm rakiplerini \u00f6ld\u00fcrmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 veya paranoyak ya da deli oldu\u011funu iddia ediyor. Ancak bu iddialar\u0131 destekleyecek herhangi bir kan\u0131tlar\u0131 da yok.<\/p>\n

Oysa elimizde olan kan\u0131tlar, bu bask\u0131 dalgas\u0131n\u0131n nedenini a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a g\u00f6stermektedir. Mironov, Eikhe ve di\u011fer b\u00f6lgesel Parti liderleri ve NKVD yetkilileri taraf\u0131ndan raporlanan y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 faaliyetler ve ayaklanmalar, \u00fczerinden iki bu\u00e7uk y\u0131l ge\u00e7mi\u015f Kirov suikast\u0131ndan beri ortaya \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lan komplolar\u0131n mant\u0131ksal bir sonucuydu.<\/p>\n

Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019in \u2018Gizli Konu\u015fmas\u0131<\/em>\u2019ndan \u00f6nce, bu komplolar\u0131n ger\u00e7ek varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda \u015f\u00fcphe duyan Sovyet ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 uzman\u0131 say\u0131s\u0131 azd\u0131. Sadece Tro\u00e7kist hareket, \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclen liderlerine sad\u0131k kalarak bu komplolar\u0131n Stalin\u2019in uydurmas\u0131 oldu\u011funu iddia ediyordu.<\/p>\n

Ancak bu durum, Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019in konu\u015fmas\u0131ndan sonra de\u011fi\u015fti. Neredeyse b\u00fct\u00fcn anti-kom\u00fcnistler (ve ayn\u0131 zamanda bir\u00e7ok kom\u00fcnist) ve tabii ki b\u00fct\u00fcn Tro\u00e7kistler, Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019in Stalin\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu su\u00e7lamalara inanmay\u0131 tercih etmi\u015flerdi. Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019in 1959\u2019da ima etti\u011fi ve onun destek\u00e7ileri taraf\u0131ndan Eyl\u00fcl 1961\u2019deki 27. Parti Kongresi\u2019nde iddia edilen su\u00e7lamalar, komplo ger\u00e7ekli\u011fine \u015f\u00fcphe ile bak\u0131lmas\u0131na neden oldu. Onlar\u0131n iddias\u0131na g\u00f6re, \u201cTuha\u00e7evski Meselesi<\/em>\u201d san\u0131klar\u0131 da dahil, t\u00fcm Moskova Davas\u0131 san\u0131klar\u0131, bir kumpas\u0131n masum kurbanlar\u0131yd\u0131lar. Mihail Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un yard\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131 da ayn\u0131 iddialar\u0131 \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fcler. Kru\u015f\u00e7ev zaman\u0131ndan beri, profesyonel Sovyet tarihi \u00f6\u011frencileri aras\u0131ndaki fikir birli\u011fi, Kru\u015f\u00e7ev-Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un pozisyonu ile uyumludur: komplolar yoktu, komplo olarak nitelenen her \u015fey Stalin\u2019in uydurmas\u0131yd\u0131.<\/p>\n

Bu t\u00fcm\u00fcyle yanl\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu komplo iddialar\u0131n\u0131n birinin bile kumpas oldu\u011fu y\u00f6n\u00fcnde ya da bu san\u0131klardan herhangi birinin masum oldu\u011fu \u015feklinde bir kan\u0131t hi\u00e7bir zaman olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bunun tam tersi do\u011frudur. Kan\u0131tlar, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, Kirov\u2019un asl\u0131nda Zinovyevci gizli bir grup taraf\u0131ndan \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc ve Kamenev ve Zinovyev\u2019in, Kirov\u2019un \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclmesi de dahil, bu grubun faaliyetlerine dahil oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir. Tro\u00e7kistler ve Tro\u00e7ki\u2019nin kendisine de ayr\u0131ca bu eylemlerde i\u015faret edilmektedir (Furr, 2013).<\/p>\n

\u00dc\u00e7 Moskova Davas\u0131\u2019nda iddia edilen komplolar\u0131n ger\u00e7ek oldu\u011fu ve t\u00fcm san\u0131klar\u0131n en az\u0131ndan itiraf ettikleri eylemlerden su\u00e7lu oldu\u011funa dair \u00e7ok a\u00e7\u0131k kan\u0131tlar var. Hatta baz\u0131 durumlarda, san\u0131klar\u0131n savc\u0131l\u0131\u011fa a\u00e7\u0131klamad\u0131klar\u0131 su\u00e7lardan da su\u00e7lu oldu\u011funu bug\u00fcn bile kan\u0131tlayabiliriz. Tuha\u00e7evski Meselesi\u2019ne dair de a\u00e7\u0131k kan\u0131tlar\u0131m\u0131z var. T\u00fcm bu kan\u0131tlar san\u0131klar\u0131n yarg\u0131land\u0131klar\u0131 eylemlerden su\u00e7lu oldu\u011fu hipotezini destekliyor (Furr, 2015). Komplolar\u0131n ger\u00e7ek oldu\u011funa dair t\u00fcm bu kan\u0131tlar, Temmuz 1937\u2019den 1938 Ekim-Kas\u0131m\u2019\u0131na kadar s\u00fcren Yevzhov\u2019un kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 objektif ve kendi ba\u011flam\u0131na uygun bir bir \u015fekilde g\u00f6rmemizi sa\u011fl\u0131yor (Furr, 2015, B\u00f6l\u00fcm 1-12).<\/p>\n

\u0130NKAR<\/strong><\/p>\n

Bat\u0131l\u0131 SSCB tarih\u00e7ileri, Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019in \u201ca\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131<\/em>\u201dn\u0131n i\u00e7eri\u011fini \u201cger\u00e7ek<\/em>\u201d farzedip, sorunsuz bir bi\u00e7imde do\u011fru kabul ettiler. Oysa Kru\u015f\u00e7ev, Stalin\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu su\u00e7lamalara hi\u00e7bir zaman herhangi bir kan\u0131t sunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, Parti ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan aranan kan\u0131tlar\u0131 da saklam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Conquest\u2019in ve Kru\u015f\u00e7ev destekli Roi Medvedev ve Alexander Nekrich gibi muhalifleri de i\u00e7eren yazarlar\u0131n \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n temel ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 kan\u0131tlar, Kru\u015f\u00e7ev d\u00f6nemi \u201cif\u015falar<\/em>\u201dd\u0131r. Bat\u0131l\u0131 tarih\u00e7ilerin Stalin d\u00f6nemini ele al\u0131\u015f\u0131ysa, hala a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak Kru\u015f\u00e7ev d\u00f6nemi a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131na dayanmaya devam ediyor.<\/p>\n

Vladimir L. Bobrov ve ben, Stephen F. Cohen\u2019in \u00f6d\u00fcl kazanm\u0131\u015f Buharin ve Bol\u015fevik Devrimi<\/em> adl\u0131 kitab\u0131n\u0131n onuncu b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc inceledik. Cohen, 1930\u2019dan Mart 1938\u2019deki idam\u0131na kadar ge\u00e7en s\u00fcrede, davalar\u0131 da dahil olmak \u00fczere, Buharin\u2019in ya\u015fam\u0131n\u0131n izlerini s\u00fcr\u00fcyor. Ancak bunu, hepsinin yalan oldu\u011fu kan\u0131tlanm\u0131\u015f Kru\u015f\u00e7ev d\u00f6nemi kaynaklar\u0131na dayanarak yap\u0131yor. Eski Sovyet ar\u015fivlerinin birincil kaynaklar\u0131ndan elde edilen kan\u0131tlara dayanarak, biz, Cohen\u2019in kitab\u0131n\u0131n bu b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde ger\u00e7ek diye ortaya koydu\u011fu ve her hal\u00fckarda Stalin\u2019in hatas\u0131 olarak iddia etti\u011fi \u015feylerin yanl\u0131\u015f oldu\u011funu g\u00f6steriyoruz (Furr and Bobrov, 2010)<\/p>\n

1917 Bol\u015fevik Devrimi\u2019nden bu yana Sovyet tarihi ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131, politik olarak anti-kom\u00fcnizmin bir tamamlay\u0131c\u0131s\u0131 \u015feklinde geli\u015fmi\u015ftir. Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar her zaman \u00e7ifte karakterli olmu\u015ftur: olup bitenleri ortaya koyma ve bunun i\u00e7in Stalin\u2019i, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ni ve genel olarak kom\u00fcnizmi k\u00f6t\u00fcleme. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, akademik Sovyetler Birli\u011fi tarih yaz\u0131c\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 objektif de\u011fildir. Baz\u0131 \u201ctabular\u0131<\/em>\u201d, asla sorgulanmayan inan\u00e7lar\u0131 vard\u0131r. Bu, \u201canti-Stalin paradigma<\/em>\u201dd\u0131r. SSCB\u2019nin akademik tarih\u00e7ileri de bu paradigmayla uyum i\u00e7inde olmaya zorlanm\u0131\u015f ya da en az\u0131ndan onu a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ihlal etmemi\u015flerdir.<\/p>\n

Anti-Stalin paradigman\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131ca \u00f6\u011fretisi, Moskova Duru\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n ve Tuha\u00e7evski Meselesinin kumpas olmas\u0131na dayan\u0131yor. Oysa bug\u00fcn bunun yanl\u0131\u015f oldu\u011funu biliyoruz. Bug\u00fcn, eski Sovyet ar\u015fivlerinden, Tro\u00e7ki ar\u015fivlerinden ve ba\u015fka bir\u00e7ok yerden elde edilen kan\u0131tlarla yap\u0131lan objektif bir ara\u015ft\u0131rma, bu komplolar\u0131n ger\u00e7ekten var oldu\u011funu kan\u0131tl\u0131yor. Bu yanl\u0131\u015f paradigma, akademik tarih\u00e7ileri ve onlar\u0131n okuyucular\u0131n\u0131 komplo davalar\u0131n\u0131 anlama olana\u011f\u0131ndan yoksun b\u0131rak\u0131yor. Bu \u00f6\u011freti, hem bizim hem de onlar\u0131n, Yevzhov d\u00f6nemindeki kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n ba\u011flam\u0131n\u0131 anlamam\u0131z\u0131 engelliyor.<\/p>\n

TEHD\u0130T GER\u00c7EKT\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ar\u015fiv belgeleri g\u00f6steriyor ki, merkezi Parti liderli\u011fi, Stalin ve Politb\u00fcro, s\u00fcrekli olarak, NKVD\u2019den komplolar hakk\u0131nda inand\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 raporlar al\u0131yordu. Bu raporlar, soru\u015fturmalar\u0131n detaylar\u0131n\u0131 ve itiraflar\u0131n tutaklar\u0131n\u0131 da i\u00e7eriyordu (Zhukov, 2003, B\u00f6l\u00fcm 13; Zhukov, 2002a, b, 23). Ayn\u0131 zamanda, bu komplolar hakk\u0131nda, SSCB s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 a\u015fan (yani Sovyet savc\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n ya da NKVD\u2019nin uydurma kapasitesi d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda olan) ba\u015fka veriler de var.<\/p>\n

STAL\u0130N\u2019E G\u00d6NDER\u0130LEN NKVD DEL\u0130LLER\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n

2 Temmuz 1937\u2019de, Merkez Komite Plenumu\u2019nun hemen ard\u0131ndan, Politb\u00fcro (Stalin ve yak\u0131n \u00e7eperi), \u201cAnti-Sovyet unsurlar \u00fczerine<\/em>\u201d ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 bir karar yay\u0131nlad\u0131. Sonraki y\u0131l boyunca veya daha uzun s\u00fcre, Stalin liderli\u011fi, SSCB \u00e7ap\u0131ndaki komplolar ve isyanlarla ilgili raporlarla bo\u011fuldu. Bunlardan bir\u00e7o\u011fu yay\u0131nland\u0131; ku\u015fkusuz bir\u00e7o\u011fu da yay\u0131nlanmadan kald\u0131. Anti-Stalin bir ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131 ve bu belgelerin edit\u00f6rlerinden biri olan V.N. Kaustov\u2019a g\u00f6re, Stalin bu raporlara inanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 (Khaustov, 2004, 234-235, No. 114).<\/p>\n

\u201cEn korkutucu \u015fey ise, Stalin\u2019in, devlet g\u00fcvenlik organlar\u0131n\u0131n baz\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fanlar\u0131n\u0131n uydurdu\u011fu sonu\u00e7lardan \u00e7\u0131kan itiraflara dayanarak karar vermesiydi. Stalin\u2019in tepkileri, onun bu itiraflar\u0131 tamamen ciddiye ald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steriyor\u201d (Khaustov, 2011, 6).<\/p>\n

Khaustov, burada Yevzhov\u2019un b\u00fcy\u00fck komplosunun varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kabul ediyor ve onun Stalin\u2019i aldatt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 teslim ediyor. Stalin, Yevzhov\u2019un kendisine sundu\u011fu kan\u0131tlara dayanarak iyi niyetle hareket etmi\u015fti, ancak Yevzhov\u2019un sundu\u011fu kan\u0131tlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu d\u00fczmeceydi.<\/p>\n

L\u0130STELER<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kru\u015f\u00e7ev:<\/p>\n

\u201cBu korkun\u00e7 uygulamada, NKVD Askeri Meclis\u2019in yetkisi alt\u0131nda davas\u0131 olanlar\u0131n listesini haz\u0131rl\u0131yor, onlar\u0131n cezalar\u0131 \u00f6nceden belirleniyor ve buna g\u00f6z yumuluyordu.<\/em><\/p>\n

Yevzhov, bu listeleri, \u00f6nerilen cezalar i\u00e7in onay\u0131n\u0131 almak \u00fczere Stalin\u2019e iletiyordu. 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda, i\u00e7inde Parti, Komsomol, Asker, Sovyet ve i\u015f\u00e7ilerin bulundu\u011fu binlerce ki\u015finin ismini bar\u0131nd\u0131ran 383 liste Stalin\u2019e g\u00f6nderildi ve Stalin bu listeleri onaylad\u0131.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Bu listeler internette \u2018Stalin\u2019in \u00f6l\u00fcm listesi<\/em>\u2019 ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile yay\u0131nland\u0131. Baz\u0131 yazarlar, bu listeleri haysiyetsizce \u2018\u00f6l\u00fcm ferman\u0131<\/em>\u2019 olarak adland\u0131rd\u0131. Ancak bunlar yanl\u0131\u015f bir adland\u0131rmayd\u0131 ve hi\u00e7 de \u2018infaz<\/em>\u2019 listesi de\u011fildi.<\/p>\n

Kru\u015f\u00e7ev\u2019i takip eden anti-Stalinci edit\u00f6rler, bu listelerdeki insanlar\u0131n \u201ccezalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nceden belirlenmi\u015f<\/em>\u201d oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yl\u00fcyordu. Ancak onlar\u0131n kendi ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 bu iddiay\u0131 yalanl\u0131yor. Ger\u00e7ekte ise, bunlar, Stalin\u2019e ve di\u011fer Sekretarya \u00fcyelerine \u2018incelenmek\u2019 i\u00e7in g\u00f6nderilen listelerdi. \u0130ncelemek\/analiz etmek (rassmotrenie) s\u00f6zc\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bir\u00e7ok defa bu listelerin giri\u015finde kullan\u0131l\u0131yordu.<\/p>\n

Bu listeler, NKVD\u2019nin ki\u015filerin su\u00e7lu olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirlemek i\u00e7in olu\u015fturdu\u011fu soru\u015fturma \u00f6nerilerini karara ba\u011fl\u0131yordu. Yani, savc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n soru\u015fturma a\u00e7ma i\u015flemine dayanakl\u0131k ediyordu.<\/p>\n

SINIRLAR<\/strong><\/p>\n

Asilere ve komploculara kar\u015f\u0131 kampanyada, Politb\u00fcro, Parti liderlerinin ve NKVD\u2019nin \u00f6l\u00fcm cezas\u0131 isteyece\u011fi ve hapsedece\u011fi insan say\u0131s\u0131 hakk\u0131nda s\u0131n\u0131rlamalar getirmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

\u201c00447 say\u0131l\u0131 d\u00fczenleme, minimum kotay\u0131 de\u011fil maksimum s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 belirliyor… Burada g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcm\u00fcz gibi, Stalin y\u0131llarca b\u00f6lgesel liderlerin kitlesel infazlar\u0131nda s\u0131n\u0131rlar getirmi\u015ftir. E\u011fer Politb\u00fcro bu anda a\u00e7\u0131k u\u00e7lu bir ter\u00f6r\u00fc isteseydi ya da b\u00f6yle bir beklenti i\u00e7inde olsayd\u0131, bu t\u00fcr \u2018s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u2019dan s\u00f6z etmenin hi\u00e7bir anlam\u0131 olmazd\u0131. Bu kelimenin anlam\u0131 herkesin bildi\u011fi gibi, hi\u00e7bir zaman doldurulmas\u0131 gereken \u2018kota\u2019 de\u011fildir. Stalin\u2019in, b\u00f6lgesel liderlerin kontrolden (veya kendisinin kontrol\u00fcnden) \u00e7\u0131kabilece\u011fi \u015feklindeki kayg\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 yans\u0131tan 00447 say\u0131l\u0131 d\u00fczenleme, bu operasyonun yerel uygulamadaki \u2018a\u015f\u0131r\u0131l\u0131klara\u2019 izin verilmedi\u011fi y\u00f6n\u00fcndeki uyar\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 iki kez tekrarl\u0131yor.<\/em>\u201d (Getty, 2013b, 231-232)<\/p>\n

Getty, son kitab\u0131nda, ayr\u0131ca bu ger\u00e7e\u011fi vurguluyor:<\/p>\n

\u201c[Sovyet tarihi] alan\u0131n\u0131n gizemlerinden biri de, \u2018limit\u2019 kelimesinin, nas\u0131l olup da s\u00fcrekli olarak doldurulmas\u0131 gereken \u2018kota\u2019 \u015feklinde \u00e7evrildi\u011fidir<\/em>\u201d (Getty, 2013b, 340 n. 109).<\/p>\n

\u201cLimit<\/em>\u201d kavram\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrekli \u2018kota<\/em>\u2019 olarak \u00e7evirenlerden biri Oleg Khevniuk, di\u011feri ise Timothy Snyder\u2019d\u0131r. \u00d6yle g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor ki, anti-kom\u00fcnist yazarlar Stalin\u2019i onursuz ve zalim g\u00f6stermek i\u00e7in \u2018kota<\/em>\u2019lara ba\u015fvurmu\u015flard\u0131r.<\/p>\n

ADAYLI SE\u00c7\u0130MLER \u0130PTAL ED\u0130L\u0130YOR<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ekim 1937 tarihli Merkez Komitesi Plenumu\u2019nda adayl\u0131 se\u00e7imlere y\u00f6nelik plan iptal edilir. Bu, Stalin ve onun Politb\u00fcro\u2019daki destek\u00e7ileri i\u00e7in ciddi bir yenilgi olur. Oysa \u00e7ok say\u0131da aday\u0131 g\u00f6steren oy pusulas\u0131 \u00f6rne\u011fi bile haz\u0131rlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Aral\u0131k 1937 Sovyet Se\u00e7imleri, aday listelerinde Parti \u00fcyesi adaylar\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra %20-25 oran\u0131nda parti \u00fcyesi olmayan adaylar\u0131n g\u00f6sterilmesiyle ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti – bu bir t\u00fcr ittifakt\u0131, ama rekabeti i\u00e7ermiyordu. Asl\u0131nda se\u00e7imlerin hi\u00e7 aday listesi i\u00e7ermeyecek \u015fekilde yap\u0131lmas\u0131, sadece ki\u015filer i\u00e7in oy kullan\u0131lmas\u0131 planlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131; bu, \u00e7ok daha demokratik bir y\u00f6ntemdi, b\u00f6ylece adaylar yaln\u0131zca aday g\u00f6sterildikleri i\u00e7in oylanmam\u0131\u015f olacakt\u0131 (Zhukov, 2000, 41; Zhukov, 2002a,b; Zhukov, 2003, 443).<\/p>\n

IAKOV IAKOVLEV<\/strong><\/p>\n

Stalin\u2019in vaat etti\u011fi 1936 Anayasa tasla\u011f\u0131n\u0131 haz\u0131rlayan Iakov Iakovlev, Stalin\u2019e en yak\u0131n ki\u015filerden biriydi. A. I. Stetskii ve B. M. Tal ile birlikte Iakovlev, anayasa metni \u00fczerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir komisyonun \u00fcyesiydi. Bu komisyon, \u015eubat 1936\u2019da Stalin\u2019e ilk tasla\u011f\u0131 sunmu\u015ftu. Bu, Stalin\u2019in 1 Mart\u2019ta Roy Howard\u2019la yapm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu \u00fcnl\u00fc konu\u015fmas\u0131nda bahsetti\u011fi taslakt\u0131 (Zhukov, 2003, 223).<\/p>\n

Ancak 10 Ekim\u2019de, t\u00fcm Politb\u00fcro ve Sekretarya \u00fcyeleri Stalin\u2019in ofisinde toplanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bir sonraki g\u00fcn ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilecek Merkez Komitesi Plenumu\u2019nun a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131\u015f\u0131nda Molotov\u2019un yapaca\u011f\u0131 sunumun ana konular\u0131 tart\u0131\u015f\u0131l\u0131p onayland\u0131ktan sonra, toplant\u0131 ak\u015fam 10\u2019da sona erdi.<\/p>\n

Molotov\u2019un sunumunun ikinci noktas\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yleydi:<\/p>\n

\u201cRakip [kelimenin tam anlam\u0131yla \u2018paralel\u2019] adaylar (zorunlu de\u011fil).<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Rekabete dayal\u0131 se\u00e7imler b\u00f6ylece h\u00fck\u00fcms\u00fcz oldu. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc, zorunlu olmad\u0131klar\u0131 s\u00fcrece, b\u00f6lgesel Parti liderlerinin (Birinci Sekreterlerin) b\u00f6yle bir se\u00e7ime izin vermesini kimse beklemiyordu. Molotov\u2019un tasla\u011f\u0131n\u0131n \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc noktas\u0131nda ise \u015f\u00f6yle yaz\u0131yordu: \u201cParti \u00fcyesi olmayanlar: y\u00fczde 20-25.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Peki ne olmu\u015ftu? Zhukov \u015fu sonuca var\u0131yor: B\u0131rak\u0131n Merkez Komitesi\u2019ni, Politb\u00fcro i\u00e7inde bile rekabete dayal\u0131 se\u00e7imleri destekleyecek bir \u00e7o\u011funluk yoktu. Hatta Parti\u2019nin (yani yerel parti liderlerinin) Sovyetlere egemen olmas\u0131n\u0131 garantileyecek g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir kararl\u0131l\u0131k vard\u0131. Belli ki Stalin \u2018diktat\u00f6r\u2019 de\u011fildi. O, u\u011fruna \u00e7etin bir m\u00fccadeleye girdi\u011fi \u015feyi elde edememi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

IAKOVLEV\u2019\u0130N TUTUKLANMASI VE \u0130T\u0130RAFI<\/strong><\/p>\n

Saratov B\u00f6lgesi Parti \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc, 1923 y\u0131l\u0131nda bir Tro\u00e7kist olan Iakovlev\u2019e g\u00fcvenmiyordu. Stalin ise, Iakovlev\u2019i savunuyordu. Ancak Merkez Komitesi Plenumu\u2019nun a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n ertesi g\u00fcn\u00fc, 12 Ekim\u2019de Iakovlev tutukland\u0131. \u0130ki g\u00fcn sonra, 1923\u2019den beri gizli bir Tro\u00e7kist oldu\u011funu itiraf etti. Hatta, bir Alman ajan\u0131 ile \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve bu ajan\u0131n kendisine anlatt\u0131\u011f\u0131na g\u00f6re, Almanlar\u0131n Tro\u00e7ki ile ileti\u015fim halinde oldu\u011funu ve kendisiyle de ayn\u0131 \u015fekilde \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmak istediklerini itiraf etmesi daha b\u00fcy\u00fck \u015fok yaratt\u0131.<\/p>\n

Iakovlev\u2019in itiraflar\u0131, son y\u0131llarda yay\u0131nlanan eski Sovyet ar\u015fivlerinin tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131z en \u00f6nemli belgelerinden biridir. Bu, ku\u015fkusuz, ana ak\u0131m SSCB tarih\u00e7ileri taraf\u0131ndan incelenmek bir yana neden hi\u00e7bir zaman bahsedilmedi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131kl\u0131yor. Iakovlev, komplocu olarak su\u00e7a bula\u015fm\u0131\u015f bir tak\u0131m \u00f6nemli Sovyet liderlerinden biridir. Ayn\u0131 zamanda, baz\u0131 dosyalarda, Iakovlev\u2019in itiraflar\u0131n\u0131 do\u011frulayan bir veya daha fazla itiraf da bulunuyor.<\/p>\n

PART\u0130 VE SEND\u0130KA SE\u00c7\u0130MLER\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sovyetler i\u00e7in rekabete dayal\u0131 se\u00e7imler yap\u0131lamasa da, Parti ve sendika organlar\u0131 i\u00e7in yap\u0131labildi. Stalin\u2019in ger\u00e7ekten de demokratik y\u00f6nelimleri vard\u0131. Yerel parti liderlerinin taban taraf\u0131ndan oylamayla se\u00e7ilmesine \u2013\u00f6yle istiyorlarsa e\u011fer\u2013 g\u00fcvenmek, demokrasinin belli ba\u015fl\u0131 gereklerinden biridir. Sovyet se\u00e7imlerinin rekabete dayal\u0131 yap\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in Stalin\u2019in verdi\u011fi demokrasi m\u00fccadelesini yenecek kadar g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc olan bu odaklar\u0131n g\u00fcc\u00fc, Parti ve sendikalardaki demokratik se\u00e7imleri durdurmaya yetmedi. 1937 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n ikinci yar\u0131s\u0131nda ilk kez demokratik sendika se\u00e7imleri yap\u0131ld\u0131. Ama bu bir daha olmad\u0131.<\/p>\n

K\u0130TLESEL BASKILAR DURDURULDU<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ana ak\u0131m tarih\u00e7ilerin 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki bask\u0131lara dair s\u00f6yledikleri, bu bask\u0131lar\u0131n nas\u0131l ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti\u011fini belgeledi\u011fi s\u00fcrece yararl\u0131d\u0131r. Bu anlat\u0131mlar, mevcut \u00e7ok say\u0131da birincil kaynaklar\u0131n incelenmesi ile, Stalin\u2019in ve en \u00fcst Parti liderli\u011finin olup bitenleri yava\u015f yava\u015f anlamaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steriyor. Onlara, kar\u015f\u0131 devrimci komplolara kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele olarak sunulan \u015fey, \u00e7o\u011fu zaman sad\u0131k parti \u00fcyelerine ve tamamen masum yurtta\u015flara y\u00f6nelmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

Ana ak\u0131m tarih\u00e7iler, Yevzhov\u2019un kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n sebeplerine, gidi\u015fat\u0131na ve sonucuna do\u011frudan de\u011finen belge niteli\u011findeki en \u00f6nemli kan\u0131tlar \u00fczerine tart\u0131\u015fma y\u00fcr\u00fctm\u00fcyor:<\/p>\n

– Bildi\u011fimiz komplolar vard\u0131. Varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 kan\u0131tlanan bu komplolar, \u00fc\u00e7 Moskova Duru\u015fmas\u0131na konu olanlar\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra basit\u00e7e Tuha\u00e7evski Meselesi olarak an\u0131lan ve parti g\u00f6revlilerinin ve askeri komutanlar\u0131n i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu komplolar\u0131 da i\u00e7inde bar\u0131nd\u0131r\u0131r. Bu komplolar, Temmuz 1937\u2019nin ba\u015flar\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanma ihtiyac\u0131na y\u00f6nelik kararlar i\u00e7in itici g\u00fc\u00e7 sa\u011flad\u0131.<\/p>\n

– Komplocu oldu\u011fu iddia edilen ki\u015filerin itiraflar\u0131 ve Yevzhov\u2019un Haziran 1937 Merkez Komitesi Plenumu\u2019nun ard\u0131ndan bir y\u0131ldan fazla s\u00fcreyle Stalin\u2019e ve merkezi Parti liderli\u011fine bombard\u0131man halinde sundu\u011fu NKVD soru\u015fturma raporlar\u0131 da ayr\u0131nt\u0131lar\u0131yla belgeleniyor. Genellikle \u00e7ok uzun ve ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 olan bu raporlar\u0131n onlarcas\u0131 yay\u0131nland\u0131. Yay\u0131nlananlardan biri de, Iakov Iakovlev\u2019in itiraf\u0131d\u0131r. Ancak bunlardan sadece birka\u00e7\u0131 \u0130ngilizceye \u00e7evrildi. Stalin\u2019in eline daha ne kadar belge ge\u00e7ti\u011fini bilmiyoruz. Bunlar muhtemelen sadece bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturuyor.<\/p>\n

– Yevzhov\u2019un asistan\u0131 Mikhail Frinovskii\u2019nin itiraf\u0131 ile Yevzhov\u2019un 1939\u2019dan sonraki itiraflar\u0131n\u0131n hepsi g\u00f6zard\u0131 edilmektedir. Ana ak\u0131m tarih\u00e7ilerin bu belgeler hakk\u0131nda yapt\u0131klar\u0131 birka\u00e7 a\u00e7\u0131klama, onlar\u0131n bu belgelere \u201cinanmamay\u0131<\/em>\u201d tercih ettiklerini g\u00f6steriyor. Zira bu bir \u2018tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131z kabul etme<\/em>\u2019, \u2018kan\u0131tland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 varsayma<\/em>\u2019 safsatas\u0131d\u0131r. \u201cBu olmu\u015f olmal\u0131<\/em>\u201d diye pe\u015fin h\u00fck\u00fcmle vard\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z paradigmaya uymuyor diye bir kan\u0131t\u0131 g\u00f6rmezden gelmek, tarih\u00e7iler a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan me\u015fru de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n

Ana ak\u0131m ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar, Yevzhov d\u00f6nemindeki kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenini a\u00e7\u0131klayan t\u00fcm delilleri g\u00f6rmezden geliyor. Sonra da, bu bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedeninin bilinmedi\u011fini ilan ediyorlar. Elbette e\u011fer kan\u0131tlar\u0131 en ba\u015ftan g\u00f6rmezden gelme karar\u0131 verilmi\u015fse, olaylar a\u00e7\u0131klanamaz.<\/p>\n

KASIM 1938: K\u0130TLESEL BASKILARA SON VERME EMR\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n

Politb\u00fcro\u2019nun NKVD\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 \u00f6nceden \u015f\u00fcphe duymu\u015f olabilece\u011fi konusunda ufak bir belgeye sahibiz.<\/p>\n

\u201c1938 ba\u015flar\u0131nda, Merkez Komitesi Shkiriatov\u2019u Ordzhonikidze\u2019ye g\u00f6ndererek, b\u00f6lgesel NKVD organlar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan yap\u0131lan \u2018kitlesel operasyonlar s\u0131ras\u0131nda kriminal sapmalar konusunda elde edilen kan\u0131tlar\u0131n ara\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131\u2019 istedi<\/em>\u201d (Jansen ve Petrov, 2002, 135).<\/p>\n

Yayg\u0131n ve gayr\u0131 resmi bask\u0131lar uyguland\u0131\u011f\u0131na dair \u015f\u00fcpheler Politb\u00fcro\u2019da artmaya devam etti. A\u011fustos 1938\u2019de Yevzhov\u2019un yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Mikhail Frinovskii\u2019nin yerini Lavrentii Beria ald\u0131. Beria, Yevzhov\u2019un daha sonra belirtti\u011fi gibi, Yevzhov\u2019u izlemek i\u00e7in g\u00fcvenilir bir ki\u015fi olarak se\u00e7ilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

Ekim 1937\u2019de, Merkez Komitesi Plenumu\u2019nda Stalin ve Politb\u00fcro, yasad\u0131\u015f\u0131 kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n kan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. 15 Kas\u0131m 1938\u2019de askeri mahkemeler ve Y\u00fcksek Mahkeme Askeri Birli\u011fi\u2019nin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra troykalarda da davalar\u0131n duru\u015fmas\u0131 durduruldu (Furr, 2016, 107).<\/p>\n

\u201c8 Aral\u0131k\u2019ta bas\u0131n, Yevzhov\u2019un \u2018kendi iste\u011fi ile\u2019 NKVD\u2019nin Ba\u015fkan\u0131 olarak g\u00f6revinden \u00e7ekildi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131. D\u00f6rt g\u00fcn sonra Moskova B\u00f6lge Mahkemesi, eski \u2018d\u00fc\u015fman\u2019lara y\u00f6nelik bir\u00e7ok mahkumiyeti kald\u0131rd\u0131. Bildirge, Y\u00fcksek Mahkeme\u2019nin sadece be\u015f in\u015faat m\u00fchendisini serbest b\u0131rakmakla kalmay\u0131p be\u015finin \u2018ger\u00e7ek d\u00fc\u015fmanlar\u0131\u2019 engelledi\u011fini kaydetti<\/em>\u201d (Getty, 1985, 188-189).<\/p>\n

YEVZHOV\u2019UN KOMPLOSU YAVA\u015e YAVA\u015e ORTAYA \u00c7IKIYOR<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yevzhov istifa edip yerine Beria ge\u00e7irilince, t\u00fcm bask\u0131lar\u0131 derhal durdurmak, onlar\u0131 etkileyen t\u00fcm NKVD Operasyonel Emirlerini kald\u0131rmak ve Savc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n t\u00fcm tutuklama vakalar\u0131n\u0131n tamam\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irilmesi gere\u011fini vurgulamak i\u00e7in emir \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. Sonra yerel NKVD gruplar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck gayrime\u015fru bask\u0131lar\u0131 ve cinayetleri (shooting) \u00fczerine Beria\u2019ya ve merkezi Parti liderli\u011fine bir rapor seli ba\u015flad\u0131. Merkez parti \u00f6nderli\u011fi ara\u015ft\u0131rmaya ba\u015flad\u0131.<\/p>\n

Politb\u00fcro \u00fcyeleri Beria, Andrei Andrev ve Georgii Malenkov, 29 Ocak 1939\u2019de, Yevzhov\u2019un g\u00f6rev s\u00fcresi boyunca kitlesel su\u00e7lar\u0131 ayr\u0131nt\u0131land\u0131ran bir rapor imzalad\u0131lar (Petrov ve Iansen, 2008, 359-363). Kitlesel bask\u0131n\u0131n, Stalin\u2019in de\u011fil, Yevzhov\u2019un i\u015fi oldu\u011funa ili\u015fkin bu \u00f6nemli kan\u0131t, ancak 2008\u2019de yay\u0131nland\u0131. Sonraki birka\u00e7 y\u0131l boyunca, NKVD su\u00e7lular\u0131n\u0131n daha fazla soru\u015fturulmas\u0131 ve yarg\u0131lanmas\u0131 ba\u015flad\u0131. Ana bir dok\u00fcman koleksiyonunun edit\u00f6rlerine g\u00f6re:<\/p>\n

\u201c…1939\u2019da NKVD 44 bin ki\u015fiyi tutuklad\u0131; bu say\u0131 1938\u2019de tutuklananlar\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k on be\u015fte birini olu\u015fturuyordu. Bu tutuklamalar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu Bat\u0131 Ukrayna ve Beyaz Rusya\u2019da idi [bu b\u00f6lgelerin Eyl\u00fcl 1939\u2019da Polonya\u2019dan geri al\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131n ve Polonyal\u0131 yetkililerin ve yerle\u015fimcilerin tutuklanmas\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak]. Ayn\u0131 y\u0131l, 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda tutuklananlar\u0131n yeniden incelemesi \u00fczerine, 110.000 ki\u015fi serbest b\u0131rak\u0131ld\u0131<\/em>\u201d (Khaustov, 2006, 564 n. 11).<\/p>\n

28 Ekim 1939\u2019da bir grup savc\u0131 Andrei Jdanov\u2019a mektup yazarak, su\u00e7suz olduklar\u0131 halde cezaevinde bulunanlar\u0131n g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irilmesindeki yava\u015fl\u0131k konusunda Merkez Komitesi\u2019nin NKDV\u2019ye m\u00fcdahale etmesini istedi.<\/p>\n

G\u00f6r\u00fcnen o ki, 17 Kas\u0131m 1938 tarihli Merkez Komitesi karar\u0131n\u0131n, Sovyet \u015fahsiyetlerini, d\u00fcr\u00fcst, sad\u0131k vatanda\u015flar\u0131, eski parti \u00fcyelerini ve t\u00fcm parti \u00f6rg\u00fctlerini ter\u00f6rize eden Yevzhov\u2019un su\u00e7lu politikas\u0131n\u0131n ve onun su\u00e7lu kli\u011finin uygulamalar\u0131n\u0131 derhal d\u00fczeltmeye y\u00f6nelik t\u00fcm giri\u015fimleri harekete ge\u00e7irmi\u015f olmas\u0131 gerekiyordu (Koenker ve Bachman, 1997, 26-27).<\/p>\n

YEVZHOV\u2019UN \u0130T\u0130RAFLARI<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yevzhov\u2019un kendi itiraflar\u0131, onun kitlesel infazlar\u0131ndan Stalin\u2019in ve merkezi Sovyet liderli\u011finin sorumlu olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steren kan\u0131tlard\u0131r. Yevzhov, bir\u00e7ok kez yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bask\u0131lar ve infazlar\u0131n kendi \u00f6zel komplocu hedeflerinin gere\u011fi olarak ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirildi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a belirtmektedir. Yevzhov, 4 A\u011fustos 1939 tarihli itiraf\u0131nda, \u201ch\u00fck\u00fcmeti ars\u0131z bir \u015fekilde kand\u0131r\u0131yorduk<\/em>\u201d demi\u015ftir. Bu itiraflar\u0131n Yevzhov\u2019un s\u00f6ylemeyi se\u00e7ti\u011fi \u015feyler d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda herhangi bir \u015feyi temsil etti\u011fine dair herhangi bir kan\u0131t yoktur \u2013i\u015fkence, tehdit veya uydurma gibi.<\/p>\n

\u0130deolojik olarak, anti-kom\u00fcnist a\u00e7\u0131klamalar, Yevzhov\u2019un Sovyet H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ne kar\u015f\u0131 komplosunun kan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131 gizlemektedir. A\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a g\u00f6r\u00fclen sebep, Stalin\u2019i, Yevzhov\u2019un y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc \u00e7ok say\u0131da infaz emrini vermekle yanl\u0131\u015f yere su\u00e7lama arzusudur.<\/p>\n

FR\u0130NOVSK\u0130\u0130\u2019N\u0130N A\u00c7IKLAMALARI<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yevzhov\u2019un yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Mikhail Frinovskii, 11 Nisan 1939\u2019da Beria\u2019ya yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada, Moskova Duru\u015fmalar\u0131ndaki san\u0131klar\u0131n su\u00e7unu a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a do\u011fruluyor. Frinovski, Yevzhov\u2019un, Buharin\u2019i ve di\u011ferlerini yanl\u0131\u015f itirafta bulunmaya zorlamad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a g\u00f6steriyor. Bunun yerine, Yevzhov onlardan, Sa\u011fc\u0131 komploculardan biri olarak kendisinin ad\u0131n\u0131 vermemelerini istemi\u015f, Buharin ve di\u011ferleri de b\u00f6yle davranm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Buharin\u2019in su\u00e7lu oldu\u011funa dair \u00e7ok say\u0131da ba\u015fka kan\u0131tlar da var. Bu kan\u0131tlar, Frinovskii\u2019nin (2006) ifadesinin do\u011frulu\u011funu g\u00f6steriyor.<\/p>\n

Yevzhov 10 Nisan 1939\u2019da tutukland\u0131. Yevzhov\u2019a g\u00f6re, bir NKVD komplosu fikri, kendisine ilk \u00f6nce Alman askeri ate\u015fesi General Ernst K\u00f6string taraf\u0131ndan \u00f6nerilmi\u015fti. Tuha\u00e7evski Meselesi, duru\u015fmas\u0131 ve infazlar\u0131 sonras\u0131nda, (\u00f6nceden beri komplocu olan) Mare\u015fal Egorov ve Almanlar, SSCB\u2019nin Almanya ve\/veya m\u00fcttefikler taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgal edilmesine yard\u0131m etmek \u00fczere y\u00f6nlendirilmi\u015f olan bu orijinal plan\u0131 yeniden g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irdi. Askeri komplodaki \u00fcst d\u00fczey \u015fahsiyetlerin devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131yla Almanlar bunun yerine darbe \u00f6nerdi.<\/p>\n

Moskova Mahkemeleri ve Tuha\u00e7evski Meselesi san\u0131klar\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda, ki bunlar\u0131n su\u00e7lu oldu\u011fu kesindi, Yevzhov\u2019un \u00f6zellikle kimleri hedefledi\u011fini bilmiyoruz. 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda yarg\u0131lan\u0131p infaz edilen Merkez Komite \u00fcyelerinin, entelekt\u00fceller ve daha d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck r\u00fctbeli subaylar gibi di\u011fer tan\u0131nm\u0131\u015f ki\u015filerin, ayn\u0131 \u015fekilde y\u00fcz binlerce s\u0131radan Sovyet vatanda\u015f\u0131n\u0131n ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131n ger\u00e7ekten su\u00e7lu oldu\u011funu bilmek isteriz. Bunun hakk\u0131nda daha fazla bilgi sahibi olmamam\u0131z\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131ca sebebi, hi\u00e7 kimsenin bu soruyu sormamas\u0131 ve bu konuda ara\u015ft\u0131rma yapmamas\u0131d\u0131r. \u00c7ok say\u0131da ki\u015fi \u201crehabilite<\/em>\u201d edildi, masum oldu\u011fu bildirildi. Fakat rehabilitasyon s\u00fcreci tarihsel de\u011fil, siyasi ve adlidir. Kru\u015f\u00e7ev ve Gorba\u00e7ov d\u00f6neminde masum olarak ilan edilen, \u201crehabilite<\/em>\u201d olan tan\u0131nm\u0131\u015f fig\u00fcrlerin \u00e7o\u011funun asl\u0131nda su\u00e7lu oldu\u011funu ve siyasi \u00e7\u0131karlar i\u00e7in masum ilan edildiklerini g\u00f6stermi\u015ftik (Furr, 2011, B\u00f6l\u00fcm 11).<\/p>\n

Yevzhov\u2019un 4 A\u011fustos 1939\u2019daki sorgulamas\u0131n\u0131n sonunda, NKVD\u2019nin, ayr\u0131ca cezas\u0131 infaz edilmeyenlerin tutuldu\u011fu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma kamplar\u0131 olan GULAG\u2019\u0131 da kontrol etti\u011fi ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaktad\u0131r. GULAG ile ilgili anlat\u0131mlar, kamplardaki ko\u015fullar\u0131n 1937-1938\u2019de k\u00f6t\u00fc oldu\u011funu ve Beria\u2019n\u0131n NKVD\u2019yi Yevzhov\u2019dan devralmas\u0131yla iyile\u015fti\u011fini kabul etmektedir. Yevzhov\u2019un a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131 da bunu i\u00e7ermektedir:<\/p>\n

\u201cIaroslavl Hapishanesi\u2019nde olup gazete g\u00f6rmeyen Evgeniia Ginzburg, mahkumlar Yevzhov\u2019un ne zaman g\u00f6revinden d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc s\u00f6yleyebilirdi diyor: Hapishanelerde ya\u015fanan s\u0131k\u0131 rejim (s\u0131k s\u0131k tecrit ve t\u00fcm ayr\u0131cal\u0131klardan yoksun b\u0131rak\u0131lma) bir g\u00fcn gev\u015fetildi. Zamanlaman\u0131n, Beria\u2019n\u0131n ad\u0131n\u0131n resmi hapishane uyar\u0131lar\u0131nda g\u00f6r\u00fcnmeye ba\u015fland\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan birka\u00e7 g\u00fcn sonraya denk d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc teyit edildi<\/em>\u201d (Getty, 1985, 189).<\/p>\n

SONU\u00c7<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d yan\u0131lt\u0131c\u0131 bir isim, ancak kimse korkmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan de\u011fil. Bu yanl\u0131\u015f bir isimlendirme, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc Conquest \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d terimini \u201cStalin\u2019in 30\u2019lu Y\u0131llardaki Tasfiyeleri<\/em>\u201d anlam\u0131nda kullan\u0131yordu, oysa bu b\u00f6yle bir \u015fey de\u011fildi. Yanl\u0131\u015fl\u0131k, ter\u00f6r\u00fcn var oldu\u011fu iddias\u0131nda de\u011fil, ter\u00f6ristlerin kim oldu\u011fu iddias\u0131nda yat\u0131yordu. Yevzhov kurbanlar\u0131ndan bir\u00e7o\u011funu rastgele se\u00e7ti ve bu korkuya yol a\u00e7an bir s\u00fcre\u00e7ti. Ancak Sovyet halk\u0131 ter\u00f6rle y\u00f6netilmiyordu ve Sovyet halk\u0131 genelde \u201cter\u00f6rize<\/em>\u201d de\u011fildi. \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r<\/em>\u201d terimi, Conquest\u2019in kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u015fekilde yanl\u0131\u015f olsa da, Sovyet Tarihi alan\u0131nda kullan\u0131lmaya devam edildi.<\/p>\n

Yevzhov\u2019un kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131, \u00fc\u00e7 Moskova Duru\u015fmas\u0131 ve Tuha\u00e7evski Meselesinde anlat\u0131lan komplolar\u0131n bir devam\u0131 niteli\u011findeydi. Yevzhov, \u2013toplu katliamlar\u2013 askeri komplo ke\u015ffedildikten ve esas olarak yok edildikten sonra, kendi NKVD komplosunu ba\u015flatt\u0131.<\/p>\n

\u00c7ok say\u0131da masum insan \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. 1939\u2019dan sava\u015f y\u0131llar\u0131na dek, NKVD\u2019nin ba\u015f\u0131 olan Beria ve Sovyet Vekilli\u011fi y\u00fcz binlerce davay\u0131 g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irdi ve yanl\u0131\u015fl\u0131kla hapsedildi\u011fine karar verdikleri y\u00fcz binlerce ki\u015fiyi serbest b\u0131rakt\u0131.<\/p>\n

Ayn\u0131 zamanda, anti-Sovyet komplolar\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekten ilgisi olan ki\u015fileri ara\u015ft\u0131rmaya, ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmaya ve cezaland\u0131rmaya devam ediyorlard\u0131. Ger\u00e7ek komplolar vard\u0131. Yevzhov ve Frinovskii\u2019nin itiraflar\u0131na g\u00f6re, Iagoda ve Yevzhov\u2019un bask\u0131 alt\u0131na ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 herkes masum de\u011fildi. Grigory Tokaev (1956) ve \u201cSvetlanin<\/em>\u201d\/Likhachev gibi Sovyet g\u00f6\u00e7menleri, baz\u0131 komplocular\u0131n kimli\u011finin hi\u00e7 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 do\u011fruluyor.<\/p>\n

Elimizdeki mevcut kan\u0131tlar iki hipotezi destekliyor. Birincisi, \u00e7ok say\u0131da Birinci Sekreter ve di\u011fer parti liderleri Sa\u011f-Tro\u00e7kist komploda yer ald\u0131. \u0130kincisi, baz\u0131lar\u0131 Yevzhov\u2019un NKVD komplosuna do\u011frudan kar\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu, bir\u00e7ok tekil delilin bir araya getirilmesiyle do\u011frulan\u0131yor. Bu deliller, ayn\u0131 zamanda, Stalin\u2019in kitle katili olmas\u0131 ve Yevzhov\u2019un ise onun \u201csad\u0131k icrac\u0131s\u0131<\/em>\u201d olarak kalmas\u0131n\u0131 talep eden ana ak\u0131m Sovyet tarih\u00e7ili\u011fi ile de tamamen \u00e7eli\u015fmektedir. Bu nedenle, ana ak\u0131m anti-kom\u00fcnist Sovyet tarih\u00e7ileri ve Tro\u00e7kistler taraf\u0131ndan reddediliyorlar. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc anti-Stalin paradigman\u0131n Procrustes*<\/a> yata\u011f\u0131na uymuyorlar.<\/p>\n

KAYNAKLAR<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Zhukov, I. 2002a. \u201cZhupel Stalina,\u201d Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 5, 6,12,13,14,15,19, 20. http:\/\/www.xlibri.ru\/elib\/smi_958\/<\/p>\n

Zhukov, I. 2002b. Repressii i Konstitutsiia SSSR 1936 goda. Voprosy Istorii. 1:3\u201326.<\/p>\n

Zhukov, I. 2000. Tainy Kremlia: Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov. Moscow: Terra-Knizhnyy Klub.<\/p>\n

Zhukov, I. 2003. Inoi Stalin. Politicheskie reformy v SSSR v 1933\u20131937 gg. Moscow: Vagrius.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>*<\/a> Grover Furr<\/strong>, Montclair Devlet \u00dcniversitesi \u0130ngilizce B\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc Orta \u00c7a\u011f Edebiyat\u0131, New Jersey\u2019de profes\u00f6rd\u00fcr. Sovyet tarihinin Stalin d\u00f6nemi konusundaki ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131yla eski ve yeni a\u00e7\u0131lan ar\u015fiv belgelerine dayanan kitaplar\u0131yla tan\u0131n\u0131r. Yak\u0131n zamanlarda, \u201cSergey Kirov Cinayeti – Tarih, Bilim ve anti-Stalin Paradigma\u201d (2013), \u201cKanl\u0131 Yalanlar – Timothy Snyder\u2019in \u2018Kanl\u0131 Topraklar\u0131\u2019nda Joseph Stalin ve Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ne Y\u00f6neltti\u011fi B\u00fct\u00fcn Su\u00e7lamalar\u0131n Delilleri Sahtedir\u201d (2014), \u201cTrotksy\u2019nin Amalgamlar\u0131: Trotsky\u2019nin Yalanlar\u0131, Kan\u0131t olarak Moskova Duru\u015fmalar\u0131; Dewey Komisyonu. Trotsky\u2019nin 1930\u2019lardaki Komplolar\u0131, Birinci Cilt\u201d (2015), \u201cYevzhov Stalin\u2019e Kar\u015f\u0131: Kitlesel Bask\u0131lar konusunda Ger\u00e7ekler ve SSCB\u2019de \u2018B\u00fcy\u00fck Ter\u00f6r\u2019\u201d (2016) olmak \u00fczere pek \u00e7ok kitap ve makale kaleme alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Yazar\u0131n internet sayfas\u0131na \u015fu linkten ula\u015f\u0131labilir: http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/grover<\/a>-furr-research.<\/p>\n

*<\/a> Yunan mitolojisinde<\/a> Procrustes<\/strong>, kendisine konuk olan yolcular\u0131n boylar\u0131n\u0131 yata\u011fa<\/a> uydurmak i\u00e7in kol ve bacaklar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekip uzatan, ya da k\u0131r\u0131p k\u0131saltan sadist ruhlu dev<\/a>. \u00c7.N.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Grover Furr* \u00c7eviren: Eren Can Bu makale, 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131nda SSCB\u2019de ya\u015fanan kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenlerini ana hatlar\u0131yla ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. Birincil kaynaklardan elde edilen bilgiler, bu bask\u0131lar\u0131n birbiriyle kesi\u015fen iki ayr\u0131 grup taraf\u0131ndan yap\u0131lan Stalin kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 komplolar\u0131n bir sonucu oldu\u011fu tezini g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde desteklemektedir. Bu gruplardan birincisini Grigorii Zinovyev, Tro\u00e7ki ve Sa\u011fc\u0131lar\u0131n (Buharin, Rikov ve taraftarlar\u0131) siyasi Muhalefetinin destek\u00e7ileri ile Mare\u015fal […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":549,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[486,421,315],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-548","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-17-sayi-nisan-2018","category-devrimler-tarihi","category-grover-furr"],"yoast_head":"\nStalin\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 Yevzhov: SSCB\u2019de 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131ndaki kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenleri<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/teoriveeylem.net\/tr\/2018\/04\/09\/staline-karsi-yevzhov-sscbde-1937-1938-yillarindaki-kitlesel-baskilarin-nedenleri\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"tr_TR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale:alternate\" content=\"en_EN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Stalin\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 Yevzhov: SSCB\u2019de 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131ndaki kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenleri\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Grover Furr* \u00c7eviren: Eren Can Bu makale, 1937-1938 y\u0131llar\u0131nda SSCB\u2019de ya\u015fanan kitlesel bask\u0131lar\u0131n nedenlerini ana hatlar\u0131yla ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. 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